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INTRODUCTION 
News about clinical trial data is constantly before our eyes lately, 
and little of it is good. Again and again we learn that some major drug 
has produced deleterious side effects.1  Internal memos emerge showing 
that the pharmaceutical companies knew or should have known about 
negative results from the clinical data, but that they overlooked or 
deliberately suppressed them.2  In the recent case of Zetia, for example, 
the manufacturers reportedly ignored test results indicating that the 
cholesterol-lowering drug combination of Zetia and Zocor was 
ineffective and potentially dangerous as well. 3   
On reflection, one might begin to ask why this trend seems so 
surprising.  Clinical trials cost vast sums of money, and, as will be shown 
later, these costs are rising so fast that they may become unsustainable 
 
1. See, e.g., Bruce M. Psaty & Richard A. Kronmal, Reporting Mortality Findings in 
Trials of Rofecoxib for Alzheimer Disease or Cognitive Impairment:  A Case Study Based on 
Documents From Rofecoxib Litigation, 299(15) J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1813 (2008); Peter 
Benesh, Second Guessing Continues For Merck, Schering; Vytorin Mess Won’t Let Up; 
Experts wonder why the pharma giants can’t leave well enough alone, INVESTORS BUS. 
DAILY, Feb. 4, 2008, available at http://www.investors.com; Rep Henry A. Waxman Holds a 
Hearing on FDA’s Drug and Device State Lawsuit Pre-emption, CONG. Q. TRANSCRIPTIONS 
(May 14, 2008); Rep. Rick Boucher Holds a Hearing on Drug Safety, CONG. Q. 
TRANSCRIPTIONS (Feb. 13, 2007) [hereinafter Boucher Hearing]. 
2. See, e.g., Boucher Hearing, supra note 1, 
Within the first three years of PDUFA, seven drugs, resulting in more than 1,000 
deaths, had been removed. Those seven deadly drugs, rushed for approval under 
PDUFA, were not needed to save lives. . . .  Today we will hear . . . how Ketek was 
approved by the FDA, even though the FDA knew the large safety study it required 
was fraught with data irregularities. Ketek is prescribed for non-life-threatening 
illnesses, but the rush to approve has resulted in . . . approximately 10 deaths related 
to Ketek’s use. 
Id.;  Psaty & Kronmal, supra note 1, [regarding Merck’s rofecoxib]: 
[I]n April 2001, the company’s internal intention-to-treat analyses of pooled data 
from these 2 trials identified a significant increase in total mortality . . . 34 deaths 
among 1069 rofecoxib patients and 12 deaths among 1078 placebo patients. . . . The 
data submitted by the sponsor to the FDA . . . in July 2001 used on-treatment 
analysis methods and reported 29 deaths (2.7%) among 1067 rofecoxib patients and 
17 deaths (1.6%) among 1075 placebo patients. This on-treatment approach to 
reporting minimized the appearance of any mortality risk. 
Id. at 1813. 
3. The partners in the Vytorin venture . . . went to market in 2004 with a drug that 
combined Schering’s Zetia with Zocor, a Merck drug whose patent expired in 2006. . . . [O]n 
Jan. 14 [they] released the results of a two-year clinical trial that had ended in 2006. . . .  [T]he 
trial found that while Vytorin did push down cholesterol, it did so with no health benefit to 
patients.  Worse, it created a potentially hazardous side effect.  Instead of clearing plaque 
from artery walls, Vytorin appears to have led to, or at least allowed, a thickening of that 
plaque. 
Benesh, supra note 1.   
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over time.4  A negative outcome will sink an entire research project, 
which, from the lab to the trial, may entail a loss of hundreds of millions 
of dollars.5 The costs of such failures must then be made up from the few 
products that do succeed, which, according to some estimates, means 
that the aggregate breakeven costs of clinical trials for any successful 
new chemical entity may reach one billion dollars.6  So one may suspect 
that there is a moral hazard here because if the pharmaceutical 
companies pay for the tests, they have a perverse incentive to paint the 
end results in the rosiest possible light.7 
The pharmaceutical companies have also lobbied successfully for 
regulatory relief from the burden of recouping the cumulative costs of 
clinical trial data in the form of a backdoor intellectual property right 
known in the United States as “marketing exclusivity”8 and in the 
European Union as “data exclusivity.”9 By these means, originator 
pharmaceutical companies obtain a period of time, ranging from three 
to ten years, during which would-be generic producers of existing drugs 
cannot themselves obtain regulatory approval for a competing drug if 
they rely—directly or indirectly—on the results of the originator’s own 
undisclosed test data, which will have been provided to governments 
 
4. See infra text accompanying notes 34-43. 
5. Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug 
Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 151-85 (2003). 
6. Id. 
7. Jerry Avorn, Dangerous Deception—Hiding the Evidence of Adverse Drug Effects, 
355(21) NEW ENG. J. MED. 2169, 2169-70 (2006).   
[Anent aprotinin’s] manufacturer, Bayer, had hired a private contract research 
organization to perform its own large observational study of postoperative 
complications in patients given the drug.  The analysis, completed in time for the 
FDA meeting, reached conclusions similar to those of Mangano et al. [which were 
negative]. . . . [P]atients who received aprotinin had higher mortality rates and 
substantially more renal damage than those given other treatments.  But neither 
Bayer nor its contractor had provided the report to the FDA or even acknowledged 
its existence before the meeting. . . .  A few years ago, it was discovered that some 
companies had funded multiple clinical trials of their selective serotonin-reuptake 
inhibitor antidepressants but reported the results of only the favorable trials—
distorting the evidence base physicians use in choosing drugs. 
Id.  One report found 90 percent of firm sponsored trials produced results favorable to the 
sponsoring firm.  Stephan Heres et al., Why Olanzapine Beats Risperidone, Risperidone Beats 
Quetiapine, and Quetiapine Beats Olanzapine:  An Exploratory Analysis of Head-to-Head 
Comparison Studies of Second-Generation Antipsychotics, 163:2 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 185 
(2006). 
8. 21 C.F.R. § 314.108(b) 
9. Valerie Junod, Drug Marketing Exclusivity Under United States and European 
Union Law, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 479, 502 (2004).   
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under strict conditions of trade secrecy.10   
Of course, the would-be competitor could not market a generic drug 
anyway until the originator’s patent had expired, and the former would 
in principle remain free to conduct its own clinical trials.  But the cost-
benefit ratio makes the latter option illusory in practice, because—apart 
from the loss of time—the generic competitor, who by definition lacks a 
patent, could not readily charge consumers enough to recoup the 
enormous costs of such trials.11  Moreover, repeating a pre-existing trial 
for such a reason raises ethical questions, because it would deny some 
patients access to medicines known to be effective purely for 
commercial purposes.12  Because the generic competitor must rely 
indirectly on the originator’s successful clinical test outcomes by 
showing that its generic product is the bioequivalent of an approved 
product, and therefore exempt from the need for further testing,13 a 
period of data exclusivity potentially becomes a means of keeping the 
generic producer off the market regardless of the status of that 
originator’s own patent.14 
In other words, even if the originator’s patent had expired, or was 
otherwise invalidated, the data exclusivity regime may provide a de 
facto alternative exclusive right by blocking the competitor’s entry into 
the market for as long as the period of such protection lasts.15 Data 
exclusivity regimes have thus become “increasingly dominant as an 
additional intellectual property layer of protection,”16 which blocks 
generic competition even with respect to second indications and other 
 
10. See, e.g., Junod, supra note 9, at 490; Meir Perez Pugatch, Intellectual Property Data 
Exclusivity, Innovation and Market Access, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH: INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 97-132 (Pedro Roffe et al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter 
Pugatch, NEGOTIATING HEALTH]. 
11. See, e.g., Karin Timmermans, Monopolizing Clinical Trial Data: Implications and 
Trends, 4 PLOS MED. 206 (2007). 
12. Id.  However, generic trials might also provide drugs to patients who otherwise 
could not afford them. 
13. See, e.g., Junod, supra note 9, at 490 (“Marketing exclusivity precludes a second 
applicant from relying on the data previously provided to demonstrate the safety and efficacy 
of the reference drug.”); id. at 506 (European Union interprets reliance as in United States, 
namely, it “refers to reliance by the drug agency, and not to direct access and use of the data 
by the second applicant”).  See also Timmermans, supra note 11, at 206 (questioning broad 
notion of “reliance” given that generic producers must submit their own data on quality in 
addition to showing chemical and biological equivalence to the original, without ever 
obtaining access to the originator’s data). 
14. See, e.g., Junod, supra note 9, at 480; infra notes 109-110 and accompanying text. 
15. Timmermans, supra note 11, at 206, 208. 
16. Pugatch, NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 10, at 117. 
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variations that are “not innovative enough to gain patent protection.”17 
The lay observer might well express surprise to learn how deeply 
rooted these alternative sui generis data exclusivity regimes have 
become in both the United States and the European Union.  After all, a 
consumer advocate might object, originator companies had been given a 
twenty-year patent monopoly for just this purpose.18  The relative 
strength of patents in the pharmaceutical sector is often justified by the 
need for consumers to cover the “risk premium,” that is, the losses 
accruing from failed pharmaceutical research projects, especially failed 
clinical trials, over and above the specific Research and Development 
(“R&D”) costs associated with any given successful drug.19 
Later in this Article, I will critically examine the various rationales, 
and particularly the incentive rationale, that supporters of these regimes 
have put forward over time.20  Suffice it to say, the pharmaceutical 
industry has quietly but successfully pursued this alternative intellectual 
property right in the results of clinical trials, independent of and 
cumulative with the patent rights that everyone takes for granted.  
Besides entrenching and expanding these regimes in the domestic laws 
of the United States21 and the European Union,22 industry 
 
17. Junod, supra note 9, at 480 (quoting Greg Perry, Director General of the European 
Generic Medicines Assoc.). 
18. Additionally, there are possible extensions for delays in approval, under 35 
U.S.C.S. § 156.  Suzan Kucukarslan & Jacqueline Cole, Patent Extension Under the Drug 
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 511 
(1994). 
19. See, e.g., Laba Karki, Review of FDA Law Related to Pharmaceuticals:  The Hatch-
Waxman Act, Regulatory Amendments and Implications for Drug Patent Enforcement, 87 J. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 602, 602 (2005) (“[P]harmaceutical companies depend 
upon these intellectual property protections not only to spur investment in research and 
development of new drugs, but also to recuperate the cost of bringing the patented drug into 
market, including the cost of hundreds of pro-drugs that typically die during the clinical trial 
phases.”).  See also Henry Grabowski, Increasing R&D Incentives for Neglected Diseases:  
Lessons from the Orphan Drug Act, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF 
TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 457-80 (Keith 
E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005) [hereinafter Grabowski, Increasing R&D 
Incentives]; Michael Enzo Furrow, Analyzing The Laws, Regulations, and Policies Affecting 
FDA-Regulated Products:  Pharmaceutical Patent Life-Cycle Management After KSR v. 
Teleflex, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 275 (2008) (“The recent decision by the Supreme Court in 
KSR International v. Teleflex Inc. poses a threat to the present balance, and pharmaceutical 
innovators in particular are at risk of losing some of the essential patent protections that 
allow them to recoup their drug discovery and development investment.”). 
20. See, e.g., G. Lee Skillington & Eric M. Solovy, The Protection of Test and Other 
Data Required by Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement, 24 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS 1 (2003); 
infra text accompanying notes 157-88. 
21. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 98 P.L. 417 
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representatives have mounted a campaign to establish similar regimes at 
the multilateral, regional, and bilateral levels.23  After a regional success 
in the North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”), this drive 
scored only a more modest victory in the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights of 1994 (“TRIPS”).24  When 
efforts to improve on the TRIPS compromise failed, the U.S. Trade 
Representative (“USTR”) began pressing other governments with 
demands for more far-reaching codified enactments of this form of 
protection for clinical trial results in the course of regional and bilateral 
Free Trade Agreements (“FTAs”).25   
Restrictions on the use of clinical data under FTAs can effectively 
empower originator pharmaceutical companies to negate a foreign 
state’s ability to authorize marketing approval of equivalent generic 
drugs for a period of five to fifteen years, even when these companies 
could not invoke patents to prevent the use of the drugs as such.26 If 
developing countries reject clauses seeking to establish these alternative 
forms of protection for clinical trial results, they may forfeit 
advantageous trade concessions, especially in negotiations with the 
United States and possibly in trade negotiations with the European 
Union.  Few governments have been willing to run this risk. 
On the contrary, with each new success,27 the pharmaceutical 
 
(Sept. 24, 1984); 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 355(c)(3)(D), 355 (j)(5), reprinted in 21 C.F.R. § 314.108 
(1993). 
22. Council Directive 2001/83, 2001 O.J. (L 311) 67 (EC), replacing Council Directive 
87/21, 1987 O.J. (L 015) 36 (EC). 
23. See, e.g., Susan Scafidi, The “Good Old Days” of TRIPS: The U.S. Trade Agenda 
and the Extension of Pharmaceutical Test Data Protection, 4 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & 
ETHICS 341 (2004); Jerome H. Reichman, The International Legal Status of Undisclosed 
Clinical Trial Data:  From Private to Public Good?, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH: 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 135-39 (Pedro Roffe et al. eds., 
2006); Carlos M. Correa, Protecting Test Data for Pharmaceutical and Agrochemical Products 
under Free Trade Agreements, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
ACCESS TO MEDICINES 81-96 (Pedro Roffe et al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter Correa, 
NEGOTIATING HEALTH].   
24. See infra text accompanying notes 66-84. 
25. See infra text accompanying notes 96-120. 
26. See infra notes 108-13. 
27. For a review of the main IP-related elements of FTAs with Vietnam, Jordan, 
Singapore, Chile, Morocco, Australia, DR-CAFTA, and Bahrain with a focus on how they 
exceed TRIPS, see Carsten Fink & Patrick Reichenmiller, Tightening TRIPS:  The Intellectual 
Property Provisions of Recent US Free Trade Agreements, The World Bank Group, Trade 
Note 20, Feb. 7, 2005, available at http://worldbank.org/trade.  For Latin America, see David 
Vivas-Eugui, Regional and bilateral agreements and a TRIPS-plus world:  The Free Trade 
Area of the Americas (FTAA) (QUNO, Geneva, QIAP, Ottawa, ICTSD, Geneva 2003). 
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companies’ demands have become more audacious, to the point where 
some of the pending FTAs with Latin American countries—for 
example, Colombia and Peru—seemed so to exceed limits of 
reasonableness, that they elicited some restraining intervention from 
Congress.28  Meanwhile, the proliferation of data exclusivity provisions 
in FTAs, with their Most Favored Nation (“MFN”) repercussions under 
Article 4 of the TRIPS Agreement,29 establishes facts on the ground that 
have growing implications for the future.30  If nothing intervenes, this 
powerful new intellectual property regime will become an ever more 
likely candidate for permanent recognition at the multilateral level.31 
This Article will track these developments and critically examine 
their deeper implications.  Part I surveys the soaring costs of clinical 
trials in developed countries, a phenomenon that must be kept in mind 
when assessing the protectionist pressures brought to bear at the 
international level.  Following a brief summary of the domestic 
responses to this and related problems in the United States and 
European Union, this part will describe and analyze the specific efforts 
that have been made to establish data exclusivity in multilateral, 
regional, and bilateral agreements. 
Part II evaluates this trend as a whole.  It first asks what legal and 
economic logic justifies this form of intellectual property protection.  To 
the extent that an incentive rationale can be mustered to justify a sui 
generis regime of clinical data exclusivity at all, it questions the validity 
of adopting a patent-like regime to support mere investment as such, 
 
28. Recent Agreement ‘Big Setback’ for Rx Companies, American Health Line, May 18, 
2007. 
A recent agreement between the Bush administration and Congress on a new policy 
for trade agreements with Columbia, Panama and Peru includes provisions that 
would increase the use of generic medications in those nations and “marks the first 
big setback for the pharmaceutical industry since Democrats claimed Capitol Hill,” 
the Wall Street Journal reports. The new policy would eliminate “linkage,” which 
requires trade partners to ensure generic medications do not violate any patents 
before they allow such treatments to reach the market. 
Id.  See infra text accompanying notes 121-25. 
29. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 4, 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 
Legal Instruments— Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197 (1994) [hereinafter 
TRIPS Agreement]. 
30. See, e.g., Timmermans, supra note 11;  Antony Taubman, Unfair Competition and 
the Financing of Public Knowledge Goods:  The Problem of Test Data Protection, 3 J. INTELL. 
PROP. & PRACTICE 591, 603 (2008). 
31. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, art. 71.1 (“[T]he [TRIPS] Council may also 
undertake reviews in the light of any relevant new developments which might warrant 
modification or amendment of this Agreement.”). 
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without obtaining any given level of creative achievement in return.   
The final segment of Part II will contend that the technical debate 
surrounding the treatment of clinical data as a subcategory of 
intellectual property law masks a much deeper problem.  Here, I argue 
that the real conceptual flaw at the core of this anomalous regime is the 
uncritical practice of treating clinical trials as a private rather than a 
public good.  I then re-elaborate the case for government oversight and 
government funding of clinical trials32 and attempt to show the 
advantages that would arise from treating clinical trials of new 
pharmaceutical products as a global public good.  The Conclusion 
summarizes the enquiry and sets out core findings and 
recommendations. 
I. EXPORTING CLINICAL TRIAL DATA EXCLUSIVITY REGIMES FROM 
DEVELOPED TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
We will see in Part II that different justifications for sui generis 
protection of clinical test data have been put forward at different times 
with varying degrees of persuasiveness.33  What remains constant behind 
the changing rhetoric is the fact that the costs of clinical trials are high, 
growing higher, and have lately become potentially unsustainable. 
A. The Egregiously High Costs and Risks of Clinical Trials 
Recent studies claim that the cost of clinical trials in the United 
States accounts for a disproportionately large share of the overall cost of 
bringing new drugs to market and now reaches $800 million to $1 billion 
per approved drug.34  While the accuracy of this figure may be disputed 
at the margins,35 it necessarily includes the cumulatively high costs of 
 
32. Tracy R. Lewis, Jerome H. Reichman, & Anthony D. So, The Case for Public 
Funding and Public Oversight of Clinical Trials, ECONOMISTS’ VOICE (Jan. 2007), available at 
http://www.bepress.com/ev [hereinafter Lewis et al., The Case for Public Funding]. 
33. See infra Part II. 
34. DiMasi et al., supra note 5, at 166.  The cost of clinical trials is only 70% of the total 
figure of $802 million that they estimate.  Cost-of-capital inflates the cost of pre-clinical 
research significantly.  Id. at 164.   
35. Christopher P. Adams & Van V. Brantner, Estimating The Cost Of New Drug 
Development:  Is It Really $ 802 Million?, 25 HEALTH AFF. 420, 427 (2006) (“[F]or one large 
pharmaceutical firm, the expected cost of developing a drug is $521 million, while for another 
large firm, it is $2,119 million.”).  Moreover, the figures for the nonprofit sector appear to be 
much lower.  See, e.g., WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, PUBLIC HEALTH, INNOVATION 
AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS:  REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATION AND PUBLIC HEALTH 75-76 (2006) (“[T]he estimates for 
public–private partnership products tend to be much lower. . . . [T]he final cost of clinical 
trials is estimated at between US$ 76 and US$ 115 million . . . [with] a total per-drug R&D 
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clinical trials incurred for the many drugs that fail to win approval.36 
Year after year, the costs of conducting clinical trials reportedly 
outstrip the medical component of the consumer price index.37  
Similarly, between 1977 and 1995, the burden of data production 
increased by 43% in mean number of pages per new drug application 
(“NDA”),38 by 37% in mean number of patients per NDA, and by 44% 
in mean number of clinical trials per NDA.39 
Other things being equal, there has been an increase of more than 
 
cost of between US$ 115 and US$ 240 million.”). 
36. DiMasi et al., supra note 5; Adams & Brantner, supra note 35. 
37. See Lori Shields, Spotlight on Research Fees:  Trends in Cost-per-Subject Pricing, 3 
J. CLINICAL RESEARCH BEST PRACS. 3 (March 2007) (“From 2000 to 2005, the price that 
sponsors pay U.S. research sites per subject for Phase II and III trials increased by 42% . . . 
[and] the complexity of these clinical studies, as measured by the total number of procedures 
performed, increased by 49%. . . . [T]he rest of the world . . . saw costs increase by 43% and 
complexity by 60%.”); Bruse Booth & Rodney Zemmel, Prospect for Productivity, 3 
NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 451, 454 (May 2004) (showing a five-fold increase in 
clinical trial costs from 1991 to 2000, and claiming “the industry trend towards more tests per 
patient and more patients per trial has led to significant increases in the direct costs of clinical 
trials”).  But see Eric L. Eisenstein et al., Sensible Approaches for Reducing Clinical Trial 
Costs, 5 CLINICAL TRIALS 75 (2008).  “Over the past decade . . . funding for phase 1–4 clinical 
trials . . . has increased from 37 to 64% of their biomedical research expenditures.  However, 
Food and Drug Administration approvals of new molecular entities dropped from 35.5 to 23.3 
entities per year over the same period.”  Id. at 76.  Nevertheless, “[o]ur results suggest that it 
is possible to reduce significantly the costs of clinical trials without adversely impacting their 
scientific objectives.  The resulting cost savings would provide increased funding so that 
additional therapies could be tested and made available for patient care.”  Id. at 83. 
38. Pierre Azoulay, The Changing Economics of Clinical Development, Earth Inst. 
(May 20, 2004) (slide 7 showed 38,044 mean pages per NDA in 1977-1980 and 90,650 in 1989-
1992, an increase of 138%).  See also Hamilton Moses, III et al., Financial Anatomy of 
Biomedical Research, 294 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1333, 1337 (2005) (Table 3 showing Phase 1-3 
trial spending growing from $3.1 billion in 1994 to $14.2 billion in 2003). 
39. THE DRUG DEVELOPMENT PROCESS:  INCREASING EFFICIENCY AND COST-
EFFECTIVENESS 338-39 (Peter G. Welling et al. eds., Marcel Dekker, Inc., 1996) (“According 
to the Boston Consulting Group, the average number of patients in clinical trials per New 
Drug Application has almost tripled from 1321 in 1981-1984 compared with 3567 in 1989-1992 
while, over the same period, the average number of clinical studies per NDA increased from 
about 30 to 60 and the number of pages per NDA increased from approximately 45,000 to 
90,000[.]”) (citing S. Engel & J.F. Jalkiewicz, Mixing up a New Formula, (12)(15) MED AD. 
NEWS 3, 1993).  See also Jeffrey S. Handen, Drug Discovery in the Modern Age:  How We Got 
Here and What Does It Mean?, in INDUSTRIALIZATION OF DRUG DISCOVERY:  FROM 
TARGET SELECTION THROUGH LEAD OPTIMIZATION 7-8 (Jeffrey S. Handen ed., CRC 
Press 2005) (“The average number of studies per NDA has increased from 30 in the early 
1980s to 70 in the mid-1990s.  The number of pages per NDA has increased from an average 
of 38,000 in the late 1970s to in excess of 100,000 in the mid-1990s.  The average number of 
patients per NDA has increased from 1321 in the early 1980s to 4327 in the mid 1990s.”)  
(citing ACTIVITIES OF THE INTERNATIONAL PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY IN 2000, CMR 
INTERNATIONAL (Surrey, U.K.)). 
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11% per year in clinical trial costs.40  Moreover, “[t]he most obvious risk 
in drug development is that, despite a long and costly development 
process, most new drug candidates will not reach the market.  Failure 
can result from toxicity, carcinogenicity, manufacturing difficulties, 
inconvenient dosing characteristics, inadequate efficacy, economic and 
competitive factors, and various other problems.”41   
Reportedly, about 20% of all compounds entering trials survive to 
FDA approval.42  If one combines the actual costs of clinical trials that 
succeed with the overall costs of those that fail, one arrives at the often 
quoted price tag for each successful drug of $800,000 to $1 billion, which 
includes the “risk premium” to recoup the costs of failed drug profits 
and failed clinical tests.43 
It bears noting at the outset that while the private sector must 
absorb these burdensome costs, the federal government has been 
spending some thirty billion dollars annually to cover the even riskier 
costs of upstream basic medical research conducted at universities.44  
Nevertheless, the soaring costs of clinical trials in developed countries 
are a fact of life that will not go away.  The demand for global 
protection of clinical tests largely arises from underlying concerns about 
perceived free-riding on private-sector R&D investments to cover these 
costs.  Such concerns must be taken into account when evaluating the 
social costs to other countries, especially developing countries, of the 
data protection measures based upon them. 
B. The Domestic Response 
While this Article is not primarily concerned with the situation in the 
United States, it is instructive to observe that, until recently, the impact 
on the public at large of measures to protect clinical test data in this 
country has been relatively modest.  Federal law currently gives 
 
40. DiMasi et al., supra note 5, at 168 (Table 4 showing clinical trial costs growing at a 
rate of 11.8% when capitalized cost is not considered and at 12.2% when capitalized cost is 
considered). 
41. Grabowski, Increasing R&D Incentives, supra note 19, at 459. 
42. DiMasi et al., supra note 5, at 165 (finding a 21.5% success rate). 
43. Id. at 180 (DiMasi sums up the numbers from Fig. 2 at 167.  But note this is the 
capitalized cost of developing a new drug, including preclinical costs.  Clinical costs as such 
were estimated at $467 million per approved drug.  Also note that these estimates are in year-
2000 dollars.). 
44. Arti K. Rai, Jerome H. Reichman, Paul F. Uhlir & Colin Crosswell, Pathways 
Across the Valley of Death:  Novel Intellectual Property Strategies for Accelerated Drug 
Discovery, 8 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1 (2008) [hereinafter Rai et al., Pathways 
Across the Valley of Death]. 
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originator companies a five-year period of exclusive marketing rights in 
clinical trial data, which starts from the date the compound is approved 
by the Federal Drug Administration.45  Since 1987, the European 
Community Members have provided protection for data filed in support 
of marketing authorizations for pharmaceuticals, which can now last 
from eight to eleven years, and this form of protection has subsequently 
been extended to other product areas in Europe.46  Analogous forms of 
protection have been enacted in many other countries since the TRIPS 
Agreement entered into force.47 
The basic five-year period established in U.S. law is independent of 
the originator’s patent rights, which last for a period of twenty years.48  
Because the patent granting process and the regulatory approval 
process, including clinical trials, are long, the effective patent life is 
considerably shorter than the statutory period of twenty years.  In 
theory, the period of market exclusivity could extend the effective 
period of patent exclusivity by denying generic producers the right to 
rely on the originator’s existing clinical trial results for another five 
years.  In practice, however, with regard to traditional small-molecule 
compounds, there is little or no impact on consumers because the five-
 
45. Concerns about preserving the confidentiality of regulatory data have surfaced only 
in the last 25 years.  TREVOR M. COOK, SPECIAL REPORT: THE PROTECTION OF 
REGULATORY DATA IN PHARMACEUTICAL AND OTHER SECTORS (Sweet & Maxwell 
2000).  Since 1982, the United States has adopted provisions to protect regulatory data 
submitted to federal agencies in connection with pesticides under the Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).  Id. at 7; 7 U.S.C. § 136 et seq.  In 1984, the United 
States also adopted regulatory exclusivity provisions for clinical trial data, which reportedly 
provide a de facto measure of regulatory data protection and which now provide five 
years [of] such protection for new chemical entities and three years for data filed in 
support of . . . chemical entities which have already been approved for use in 
medicines but [for] which fresh authorizations are [to be] based on new clinical 
investigations. 
COOK, supra note 45, at 7.  See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 
1984, 98 P.L. 417 (Sep. 24, 1984); 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 355(c)(3)(D), 355(j)(5) (reprinted in 21 
C.F.R. § 314.108) (1993).  The five-year period of exclusivity extends from the approval of the 
original drug to the approval of a generic version based on bioequivalence. Pugatch, 
NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 10, at 103. 
46. Directive 2004/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 
2004 amending Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community Code Relating to  Medicinal 
Products for Human Use, 05 EC, 30 April, L136/34; Pugatch, NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra 
note 10, at 105. See also Junod, supra note 9; Carlos M. Correa, Unfair Competition Under the 
TRIPS Agreement:  Protection of Data Submitted for the Registration of Pharmaceuticals, 3 
CHI. J. INT’L L. 69 (2002) [hereinafter Correa, Unfair Competition Under the TRIPS 
Agreement]; Correa, NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 23.   
47. See generally Taubman, supra note 30. 
48. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1994). 
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year period of data exclusivity runs concurrently with the period of 
patent protection and is usually absorbed into its duration with little 
overlap.49 
There is, however, a gray area where clinical data are used to justify 
new indications of chemical entities that have already been approved, 
which can yield another three-year term of exclusivity in the United 
States.  This three-year term “for making product changes that require 
clinical trials to gain approval” starts with the approval of the 
supplemental application.50  In such cases, uncertainty in the rules could 
reportedly lead to delays in the entry of generic producers beyond the 
life of the patent itself.51   
Pending legislative proposals, if enacted, could confer twelve to 
fourteen years of market exclusivity on data pertaining to approved 
biological medicines, that is, the large molecule medicines that are 
currently attracting considerable attention.52  Here there are questions 
about the FDA’s ability to approve so-called bio-similar generics, which 
are not chemical compounds and which depend on materials that are 
deemed bioequivalent or sufficiently bio-similar as to justify reliance on 
the originator’s test data without need to conduct new tests on the 
 
49. Professor Rebecca Eisenberg states, “The five-year period of data exclusivity for a 
new chemical entity begins with first market approval and therefore often runs concurrently 
with patent protection, although in some cases it may last longer.”  Rebecca Eisenberg, The 
Role Of The FDA In Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 360 
(2007).  Footnote nine in Eisenberg’s article notes an exception: Paxil gained marketing 
exclusivity via this mechanism after the patents on it had expired.  Id. at 348. 
50. Eisenberg, supra note 49, at 360; Junod, supra note 9. 
51. Junod, supra note 9.  But see Eisenberg, supra note 49, at 360 (“The data exclusivity 
thereby gained is limited to the terms of the new approval, and will not prevent a competitor 
from using an ANDA to sell the product as previously approved, or for previously approved 
indications.  This has proven to be a very significant limitation on the use of a supplemental 
NDA to gain approval to market a drug for a new indication.”). 
52. PATHWAY FOR BIOSIMILARS ACT, H.R. 5629, 110th Cong. (2008).  The Pathway 
for Biosimilars Act provides in § 101(k)(7) for twelve years of exclusivity for the “reference 
product,” but it does not consider evergreening applications relevant.  Id.  Exclusivity is 
extended up to fourteen years from initial approval if a significant new indication is approved 
as a supplement within eight years of the original approval.  Id.  An additional six months to 
the twelve or fourteen year exclusivity term can be awarded for discovery of beneficial 
pediatric use.  Id.  Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2007 had the same 
twelve year term but not the fourteen year term or pediatric extension.  BIOLOGICS PRICE 
COMPETITION AND INNOVATION ACT OF 2007, S. 1695, 110th Cong. § 2(k)(7) (2007).  A 
biological product is defined as “a virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, blood, 
blood component or derivative, allergenic product, or analogous product . . . applicable to the 
prevention, treatment, or cure of a disease or condition of human beings.”  Public Health 
Services Act, 42 U.S.C. § 262(i) (2002).  See Marc A. Goshko, U.S. Legislative Considerations 
for Generic Biologics, 10th Annual IGPA Conference (Nov. 29, 2007). 
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generic product.53  Because the methods of scientific assessment are 
different for biologics than for small-molecule compounds, there are 
unanswered legal, economic, and administrative questions in this area.  
For example, one economist knowledgeable about the industry 
estimates that the breakeven point for producers of biologics is much 
higher than that for small molecules, largely because of higher risk of 
failure in Phase III clinical trials.54 
The pending legislation would enable the FDA to recognize bio-
similarity for purposes of generic entry in exchange for a marketing 
exclusivity period (derived from the costs of data) for twelve to fourteen 
years.  If enacted, this provision could extend beyond the effective life 
of the patent, which would otherwise be shortened by the years 
needed—sometimes as much as ten years—to obtain regulatory 
approval in the first instance.55 
C. The Drive for Global Protection of Clinical Trial Data 
The United States and the European Union have been seeking 
universal norms to protect the results of clinical trial data on new 
pharmaceutical products through bilateral and multilateral trade 
negotiations.56  When developing countries agree to this new form of 
 
53. Two U.S. statutes apply to the regulation of biological products.  See Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 30.1 et seq. (FFDCA); Public Health Services Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 262 (PHSA).  See also Goshko, supra note 52. 
54. Henry Grabowski, Data Exclusivity for New Biological Entities (June 2007) 
(working paper, on file with Duke Univ. Dept. Econ.) [hereinafter Grabowski, Data 
Exclusivity], available at 
http://www.econ.duke.edu/Papger/PDF/DataExclusivityWorkingPapers.pdf. Professor 
Grabowski’s elegant analysis makes no mention of the role that government funding might 
play with regard to biologics, and no independent verification of his figures has so far been 
found.  Id. 
55. However, there are other existing measures that may partly compensate patentees 
for this loss of effective patent life.  See Hatch-Waxman Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355, 35 U.S.C. § 
271(e) (1994). 
56. See U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVES, 2008 SPECIAL 301 REPORT (2008), available 
at 
http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2008/2008_Special_301_Report
/Section_Index.html; PRESIDENT’S 2007 TRADE POLICY AGENDA AND 2006 ANNUAL 
REPORT, available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2007/2007_Trade_Policy
_ Agenda/asset_upload_file278_10622.pdf (mentions test data protection as an issue multiple 
times).  But see PRESIDENT’S 2008 TRADE POLICY AGENDA AND 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, 
available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/
/2008_Trade_Policy_Agenda /asset_upload_file490_14556.pdf (While the report does not 
mention test data protection, this omission was not a change in policy, just in public 
emphasis).   Is this a change in policy or just in public emphasis?  Data exclusivity has now 
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intellectual property protection, their rights to promote the production 
of generic drugs and low-priced medicines generally, as clarified in the 
Doha Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health57 and in related implementing decisions,58 can become 
compromised by the new, exclusive rights in clinical test data, which are 
not directly covered by those arrangements.59 
1. From NAFTA (1992) to TRIPS (1994) 
NAFTA was a kind of blueprint for the TRIPS Agreement of 1994.  
It set out, and largely obtained, many of the IP objectives that USTR 
hoped to later codify during the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations. 
a. The NAFTA Provisions 
The NAFTA provisions on intellectual property established two 
important principles with regard to clinical test data.  One was that 
clinical data submissions to governments for regulatory approval of new 
chemical entities must be protected against non-disclosure, or at least 
“unfair commercial use.”60  The other was that a generic producer could 
not rely on pre-existing test data for regulatory approval based on 
“bioequivalence and bioavailability studies” for a period of at least five 
 
also surfaced in confidential negotiations between the European Union and developing 
countries on European Economic Partnership Agreements. 
57. World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health, Ministerial Declaration of 20 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.doc. 
58. General Council, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 (Sept. 2, 2003), available at 
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/L/540.doc; General Council, Amendment of 
the TRIPS Agreement, WT/L/641, (Dec. 8, 2005), with attachment, Protocol Amending the 
TRIPS Agreement (Annex setting out pending Article 31bis). 
59. See Frederick M. Abbott & Jerome H. Reichman, The Doha Round’s Public 
Health Legacy:  Strategies for the Production and Diffusion of Patented Medicines Under the 
Amended TRIPS Provisions, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 921, 962-65 (2007). 
60. North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-U.S.-Mex., art. 1711.5, Dec. 17, 
1992, 32 I.L.M. 605, 675 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA] provides as follows: 
If a Party requires, as a condition for approving the marketing of pharmaceutical or 
agricultural products that utilize new chemical entities, the submission of 
undisclosed test or other data necessary to determine whether the use of such 
products is safe and effective, the Party shall protect against disclosure of the data of 
persons making such submissions, where the origination of such data involves 
considerable effort, except where the disclosure is necessary to protect the public or 
unless steps are taken to ensure the data is protected against unfair commercial use. 
Id.   
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years “from the date on which the Party granted approval to the person 
that produced the data for approval to market its product, taking 
account of the nature of the data and the person’s efforts and 
expenditures in producing them.”61 
This innocuous sounding provision could have produced new 
barriers to generic producers because it seemed to open a five-year 
window of market exclusivity in Canada and Mexico for drugs that were 
not otherwise patented there for one reason or another, or for drugs 
whose period of patent protection in those countries was about to 
expire.  However, these effects were tempered by the ambiguous 
language in a third provision, which seemed to allow a regulatory 
authority room to approve a drug by expressly “relying” on the date of 
first approval in the originator country,62 say, the United States. In that 
case, the five year period would probably run contemporaneously with 
the U.S. patent and not necessarily add any appreciable time of 
independent exclusivity in Canada or Mexico.63 
Despite the ambiguity inherent in these provisions, the Bayer 
pharmaceutical company contended that Canada had violated the treaty 
when it gave regulatory approval to a generic drug based on a showing 
of bioequivalence.  The crux of the argument was that this approval 
violated the requirement that clinical test data must be protected 
 
61. Article 1711.6 of NAFTA provides as follows: 
Each Party shall provide that for data subject to Paragraph 5 that are submitted to 
the Party after the date of entry into force of this Agreement, no person other than 
the person that submitted them may, without the latter’s permission, rely on such 
data in support of an application for product approval during a reasonable period of 
time after their submission.  For this purpose, a reasonable period shall normally 
mean not less than five years from the date on which the Party granted approval to 
the person that produced the data for approval to market its product, taking account 
of the nature of the data and the person’s efforts and expenditures in producing 
them.  Subject to this provision, there shall be no limitation on any Party to 
implement abbreviated approval procedures for such products on the basis of 
bioequivalence and bioavailability studies. 
NAFTA, supra note 60, art. 1711.6. 
62. Article 1711.7 of NAFTA provides as follows, “Where a Party relies on a 
marketing approval granted by another Party, the reasonable period of exclusive use of the 
data submitted in connection with obtaining the approval relied on shall begin with the date 
of the first marketing approval relied on.”  NAFTA, supra note 60, art. 1711.7. 
63. This conclusion disregards the ambiguities that might arise from data showing new 
indications for an existing chemical entity.  See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.  For 
the view that United States practice underlies the three provisions set out in Article 1711 of 
NAFTA, which deal explicitly with regulatory data through Articles 1711.5, 1711.6, and 
1711.7, see COOK, supra note 45, at 7. 
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“against unfair commercial use.”64  In 1999, however, a Canadian court 
held that Canada was not barred from approving a competitor’s generic 
drug without at least five years of protection from competition when 
that competitor had based his application for marketing approval on a 
comparison with the innovator’s own product.65   
 
 The Court held that the safety and effectiveness of the 
generic product could be demonstrated by showing that the 
competitor’s product was the pharmaceutical bioequivalent of 
the innovator’s product, which was being publicly marketed.  
Because the minister need not rely upon the confidential 
information as such in that event, the minimum five-year market 
protection otherwise available under domestic regulations did 
not apply. 
 By the same token, the Court held that Articles 1711.5 and 
1711.6 of NAFTA did not require a different outcome so long as 
the generic manufacturer was able “to establish the safety and 
effectiveness of its product on the basis of bioequivalence or bio-
availability studies without the minister having to examine and 
rely on confidential data filed by the innovator.”  Such a 
demonstration was not an “unfair commercial use” within the 
purview of either the Canadian regulation or Article 1711, which 
“do not provide or require that the innovator be protected from 
competition.”66 
b. The Softer TRIPS Provisions 
Logically, the United States sought to build upon, and strengthen, its 
NAFTA blueprint during the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, which lasted from 1986 to 1994.  These proposals, which 
met with strong resistance from the outset, survived into the Brussels 
Draft of the TRIPS Agreement in 1990.67  Here, however, they appeared 
in a bracketed provision that marked off the United States’ (and 
 
64. Bayer Inc. v. Canada (Attorney Gen.) (Trial Division), [1998] 1 F.C. 553, T-1154-97 
(Can.), affirmed by [1999] 243 N.R. 170 (Fed. Ct. App.) (Can.), appeal denied [2000] 259 N.R. 
200 (Can.); Reichman, NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 23, at 135-39.  See also Bristol-
Myers Squibb Co. v. Canada (Attorney Gen.), [2005] 1 SCR 533, 2005 SCC 26.     
65. Bayer Inc. v. Canada (Attorney Gen.), [1999] 243 N.R. 170 (Fed. Ct. App.) (Can.), 
appeal denied [2000] N.R. 200 (Can.). 
66. Reichman, NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 23, at 143. 
67. Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations, Brussels, Belgium, Nov. 26, 1990, art. 42 [hereinafter Brussels Draft 
TRIPS Agreement 1990], compiled in STEWART, THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND:  A 
NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992) 260 (Terence P. Stewart ed., 1993). 
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European Union’s) position from those of other countries opposed to 
recognizing any period or principle of exclusive marketing rights 
attributable to the submission of clinical test data as such.  This 
bracketed provision would, in effect, have required nonuse of the 
information for the approval of competing products for no less than five 
years, unless the originator who submitted the data otherwise agreed.68  
One year later, in an effort to reach a final agreement, the Chairman’s 
Draft Final Act (the so-called Dunkel Draft of 1991) discarded the 
bracketed U.S.-EU proposal altogether.69  The Dunkel Draft, with only 
minor technical changes, was then adopted as Article 39.3 of the TRIPS 
Agreement in 1996.70 
Article 39, as a whole, constituted an historic achievement in that it 
brought trade secret protection within the ambit of the Paris 
Convention’s existing provisions mandating worldwide measures against 
unfair competition.71 However, as I explained in a previous article, the 
 
68. Reichman, NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 23, at 135-39.  Article 4A contained 
a bracketed provision that marks off the United States (and European Union) positions from 
those of other countries opposed to this new form of protection for regulatory data.  This 
proposed provision is reproduced as follows: “PARTIES, when requiring, as a condition of 
approving the marketing of new pharmaceutical products or of agricultural chemical 
products, . . . the submission of undisclosed test or other data, the origination of which 
involves a considerable effort, shall protect such data against unfair commercial use.”  
Brussels Draft TRIPS Agreement of 1990, supra note 67, art. 4A, at 2308.  Unless the person 
submitting the information agrees, the data may not be relied upon for the approval of 
competing products for a reasonable time, generally no less than five years, commensurate 
with the efforts involved in the origination of the data, their nature, and the expenditure 
involved in their preparation.  “In addition, PARTIES shall protect such data against 
disclosure, except where necessary to protect the public.”  Id.  This proposal applied the 
regulatory data provision to cover approval of “new pharmaceutical products or of a new 
agricultural chemical product.”  STEWART, THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND:  A 
NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992) 2308.  In addition, the bracketed provision essentially 
required “protection against unfair commercial use and disclosure, as well as non-use of the 
information for the approval of competing products, for no less than five years, unless the 
person submitting the information agrees.”  Id. (italics supplied).   
69. Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations, 20 December 1991, art. 39.3 [hereinafter Dunkel Draft], compiled in 
STEWART, THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND:  A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992) 869 
(Terence P. Stewart ed., 1993). 
70. Members, when requiring, as a condition of approving the marketing of 
pharmaceutical or of agricultural chemical products which utilize new chemical 
entities, the submission of undisclosed test or other data, the origination of which  
involves considerable effort, shall protect such data against unfair commercial use.  
In addition, Members shall protect such data against disclosure, except where 
necessary to protect the public, or unless steps are taken to ensure that the data are 
protected against unfair commercial use. 
Dunkel Draft, supra note 69. 
71. See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 10bis, Mar. 20, 
REVISED REICHMAN FINAL 3-9-09 3/9/2009  2:26 PM 
2009] RETHINKING THE ROLE OF CLINICAL TRIAL DATA 19 
 
collocation of clinical test data within the provisions regulating unfair 
competition negated any inference that the TRIPS drafters had imposed 
an exclusive intellectual property right on this subject matter and 
indirectly confirmed the implications to be drawn from the deletion of 
the U.S.-EU bracketed proposal between 1990 and 1991.72 
As adopted, Article 39.3 of TRIPS merely obliged 
 
WTO Members, when requiring the submission of undisclosed 
tests or other data as a condition of approving the marketing of 
pharmaceutical or agrochemical products that utilize new 
chemical entities, to take positive action to protect such data 
against ‘unfair commercial use.’  There is also an independent 
obligation to protect such data against ‘disclosure, except where 
necessary to protect the public;’ but the text goes on to recognize 
that the steps taken to prevent ‘unfair commercial use’ would 
normally encompass and discharge the duty to protect such data 
against ‘disclosure.’73 
 
WTO Members have no duty to “require . . . the submission of 
undisclosed test or other data” and they may rely upon the health and 
safety decisions of other jurisdictions, or on the published medical 
literature, or a combination of both, without incurring liability under 
Article 39.3.  When a state does require the relevant submission of 
undisclosed data, it remains free to make noncommercial uses of the 
data and to make other uses of them that are “fair,” even if such uses 
produce a commercial impact.  For example, governmental use to avoid  
health or safety risks revealed by the data in the local environment are 
fair by definition.  Similarly, the promotion of research and science in 
the public interest “would presumably allow some uses of the data that 
would be both noncommercial and fair, consistent with any research 
exemption embodied in the domestic patent laws.”74 
 
 In principle, the meaning of ‘unfair commercial use’ will 
 
1883, as rev. at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583 [hereinafter Paris Convention]; 
G.H.C. BODENHAUSEN, GUIDE TO THE APPLICATION OF THE PARIS CONVENTION FOR 
THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY AS REVISED AT STOCKHOLM IN 1967 (BIRPI 
1968).  See generally STEPHEN P. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED RIGHTS:  
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION (Harvard Univ. Press 1975).   
72. See generally Reichman, NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 23, at 135-39. 
73. Id. at 141-42. 
74. Id.  Cf. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, art. 27.2 (exception to patentability for 
ordre public). 
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depend upon the kind of practices that domestic and foreign 
trade secret laws have traditionally regarded as unfair, together 
with any new case law dealing specifically with the protection of 
clinical test data as a distinct category of unfair competition law.  
This follows from the fact that the drafters of Article 39.3 
expressly linked it to Article 10bis of the Paris Convention and 
thus to the duty it imposes to avoid any ‘act of competition 
contrary to honest practices in industrial or commercial matters’ 
([A]rticle 10bis(2)).75 
 
Many different scenarios may be imagined,76 including the possibility 
that any given state might include “unjust enrichment” within the 
purview of its domestic unfair competition law.77  In such a state, courts 
could consider the extent to which allowing regulatory approval on the 
basis of bioequivalence, without more, destroyed any incentive to 
generate the data needed to bring the product to market,78 as well as the 
extent to which that incentive had been amply sustained in the country 
of origin (or other relevant countries).  But none of these scenarios 
necessarily justifies the five-year exclusive marketing right that the 
Dunkel Draft definitively deleted in 1991.   
As to case law precedents, they are not favorable to a tough 
interpretation of the “nondisclosure” and fair use requirements of 
Article 39.3.  In the United States, for example, a 1984 Supreme Court 
decision observed that the filing of confidential data prior to 
congressional decisions to confer special protection upon such data 
could not be construed as conferring any assurance against internal 
agency use during the consideration of the application of a subsequent 
 
75. Reichman, supra note 23 at 141-42.   See also Paris Convention, supra note 71, art. 
10bis(2); BODENHAUSEN, supra note 71. 
76. Reichman, NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 23, at 141. 
On its face, the provision requiring fairness seems clear only at the extremes.  At 
one pole, “disclosure” is expressly included within the concept of measures to 
prevent unfair commercial use.  Hence, states requiring the submission of clinical 
trial data must take steps not to disclose the contents of these submissions to 
unauthorized third parties.  At the opposite pole, however, the duty to prevent 
“unfair commercial use” arguably imposes a conduct-based liability rule, but not an 
exclusive property right requiring only authorized uses of the data or of the health 
and safety conclusions to which they lead.  Otherwise, the deletion of the proposals 
embodied in the Brussels Draft TRIPS Agreement of 1990 would be ignored.   
Id. 
77. See Taubman, supra note 30, at 601. 
78. Id. at 602. 
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firm for product registration.79  The reluctance of the U.S. Supreme 
Court in that case to impose an unqualified restriction on the use of data 
filed with regulatory authorities was expressly conditioned on the need 
to sustain competition in unpatented products.80 
As noted above, moreover, “a similar decision was reached in the 
[1999] case of Bayer Inc. v. Canada, in which the Canadian Federal 
Court of Appeal construed Canadian law in light of Article 1711 of 
NAFTA,”81 which resembles the provision adopted in Article 39.3.  The 
Canadian court found no grounds in this provision to bar regulatory 
approval of generics on the basis of a showing of bioequivalence to 
formulations approved under pre-existing data submissions.82 
In general, one may conclude that the TRIPS provisions set out in 
Article 39.3 did expand the worldwide obligations of WTO members to 
prohibit acts of unfair competition within the meaning of Article 
10bis(3) of the Paris Convention.83  But incorporation of this provision 
into Article 10bis of the Paris Convention (and by virtue of that 
incorporation, of article 10bis into the TRIPS Agreement itself)84 in no 
way enlarged the boundaries of the specific obligations codified in 
Article 39.3.85  If anything, they further precluded any application of 
Article 39.3 in a manner representing an exclusive property right, as 
distinct from a conduct-based liability rule.86 
The ultimate meaning of ‘unfair commercial use’ under Article 39.3 
“will depend upon the kind of practices that domestic and foreign trade 
secret laws have traditionally regarded as unfair.”87  These practices are 
 
79. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1019-20 (1984). 
80. Id. 
81. Reichman, NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 23, at 143.   
82. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.   
The decision of the Canadian Court of Appeal is all the more compelling in that it 
was taken in the face of the NAFTA regime, which, as previously observed, is 
stronger [overall] than the regime ultimately adopted in Article 39.3 of the TRIP[s] 
Agreement.  The latter regime, which reflected a decision to delete provisions 
analogous to those in Articles 1711.5 and 1711.6 of NAFTA, would mandate a 
similar conclusion, even if the Canadian Court were to have misconstrued the 
NAFTA provisions applicable in that case. 
Reichman, NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 23, at 143. 
83. For an  analysis, see id., at 137-44. 
84. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, art. 2.1. 
85. Reichman, NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 23, at 137-44. 
86. See Correa, Unfair Competition Under the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 46, at 81-
84. 
87. Reichman, NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 23, at 144.  For example, 
governments should not set themselves up as commercial rivals who profit from the 
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too diverse to establish any consensus–based rules of universal 
application.88  However, Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement 
 
does not prevent governments from relying upon decisions to 
allow the [marketing] of relevant [medicines] in other 
jurisdictions, nor does it prevent Members from authorizing the 
[marketing] of bioequivalent products on the basis of positive 
regulatory decisions by local authorities.  Legislative history, 
competition policy and sound principles of treaty interpretation 
support this conclusion, as do important decisions in [at least] 
two domestic courts.89 
2. The Posterior Free Trade Agreements 
The soft provisions of the TRIPS Agreement were the most that the 
technology-exporting countries could obtain at the multilateral level.  
After 1994, the only substantive multilateral agreements were the 
WIPO cyberspace treaties of 1996, and these produced a negotiated 
middle ground in which users’ and consumers’ interests were relatively 
well balanced against those of rights holders’.90  Since then, efforts to 
ratchet up patent protection at the multilateral level have been blocked 
by developing country resistance,91 and a coalition of those countries 
plus non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) has put a Development 
Agenda, with emphasis on “Access to Knowledge,” at the forefront of 
WIPO’s future work program.92 
 
submission of regulatory data.  They must impede state employees from doing the same and 
they must impede citizens from gaining access to confidential regulatory data by devious 
means.  Id.   
88. Taubman, supra note 30, at 602. 
89. Reichman, NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 23, at 144. 
90. WIPO Copyright Treaty of 1996, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/ 
[hereinafter WCT]; WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty of 1996, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wppt/ [hereinafter WPPT]; Jerome H. Reichman, Graeme 
B. Dinwoodie, & Pamela Samuelson, A Reverse Notice and Takedown Regime to Enable 
Public Interest Uses of Technically Protected Copyrighted Works, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
981 (2007). 
91. Jerome H. Reichman & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Harmonization Without 
Consensus:  Critical Reflections on Drafting a Substantive Patent Law Treaty, 57 DUKE L.J. 85, 
99-122 (2007). 
92. WIPO, Committee on Development and Intellectual Property (CDIP), Second 
Session, July 2008, Revised Draft Report, WIPO doc. CDIP/2/4 Prov. 2 (November 21, 2008) 
(Annex I, Information on Activities in Respect of 19 Adopted Recommendations); Amy 
Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of Intellectual 
Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804 (2008); Tim Hubbard & James Love, A New Trade Framework 
for Global Healthcare R&D, 2 PLOS BIOLOGY 0147 (2004).   
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As Professor Ruth Okediji and others have observed,93 the response 
of the technology-exporting countries was to shift their negotiating 
efforts to regional and bilateral trade agreements, where their 
bargaining position was disproportionately stronger.94  In one FTA after 
another, ever tighter and more unbalanced intellectual property 
provisions have been accepted by governments willing to pay almost any 
price for the trade concessions offered them in other areas.95 
a. Expanding Protection for Clinical Trial Data in Developing 
Countries 
Why developing countries at all economic levels have succumbed to 
the one-sided, virtually nonnegotiable intellectual property provisions 
that USTR has imposed upon them in the various FTAs remains 
unclear.96  Certainly, it was not for lack of technical expertise or advice.  
If anything, the negotiators representing the Latin American countries, 
for example, often evidenced more skill and ability than their USTR 
counterparts, who took their marching orders from a “knowledge 
cartel”97 without engaging in overly subtle nuances of persuasion.  In 
 
93. Ruth Okediji, Back to Bilateralism? Pendulum Swings in International Intellectual 
Property Protection, 1 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 125 (2004); Daniel J. Gervais, TRIPS and 
Development, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT 3, 260 (D.J. 
Gervais ed., Oxford 2007). 
94. See generally Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting:  The TRIPS Agreement and 
New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 
(2004). 
95. Timmermans, supra note 11.  Note the status of treaties:  Establishment of a Free 
Trade Area, U.S. – Jordan FTA, Oct. 24, 2000; Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Singapore FTA, 
May 6, 2003; Free Trade Agreement, U.S.–Chile FTA, June 6, 2003; Free Trade Agreement, 
U.S.–Morocco FTA, June 15, 2004;  Free Trade Agreement, Dom. Rep.–Cent. America, Aug. 
5, 2004; Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.–Bahrain FTA, Sep. 14, 2004; 
Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.–Oman, Nov. 15, 2004; Establishment of a Free 
Trade Area, U.S.–Australia FTA, May 18, 2005; Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.–
Peru FTA, Apr. 12, 2006.  Additional FTAs have been signed with Colombia, Panama, and 
Korea but have not been ratified by Congress.  For a complete list, with reference to clinical 
test data protection, see Taubman, supra note 30, 594 n. 24. 
96. See, e.g., Fink & Reichenmiller, supra note 27.  See also William Watson & Viet D. 
Do, Economic Analysis of Regional Trade Agreements, in REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 
AND THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 3-22 (L. Bartels & F. Ortino eds., Oxford 2006).    
97. See Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman, The Globalization of Private 
Knowledge Goods and the Privatization of Global Public Goods, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 
GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY REGIME 3-45, 19 (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2003) 
[hereinafter Maskus & Reichman, The Globalization of Private Knowledge Goods].  See 
generally SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW:  THE GLOBALIZATION OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (Cambridge Univ. Press 2003).   
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virtually every case, the intellectual property provisions, left to the end 
of the negotiations, were put forward on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.  As 
each single state or group of states succumbed to the latest set of 
demands, USTR elevated past demands to a new and higher level in the 
next round of negotiations.  As Professor Bryan Mercurio recently 
observed, “the current bilateralism unashamedly seeks to fragment 
developing country coalitions while at the same time taking advantage 
of unequal bargaining power in bilateral negotiations.”98 
Whether, at the end of the day, the aggregate value of the overall 
trade concessions obtained by the central administrations in these FTAs 
justifies or compensates for the losses accruing from rents and other 
restrictions on intellectual property is not for me to adjudicate.99  
Whatever the gains, there is reason to believe that the central 
administrations that sign these agreements have undervalued or ignored 
the social costs of these intellectual property provisions.  If so, the 
hidden costs will likely play out in terms of hampering the delivery of 
essential public goods, such as public health, education, agriculture, and 
scientific research, which remain heavily dependent on the public sector 
in these countries, owing to the rising costs of knowledge goods and 
other inputs needed for the delivery of these same public goods.100  
While there remain some defensive options that states may still take, 
even after these treaties enter into force,101 there is little evidence that 
 
98. Bryan Mercurio, TRIPS-Plus Provisions in FTAs:  Recent Trends, in REGIONAL 
TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 215, 221 (Lorand Bartels & Frederico 
Ortino eds., 2006). 
99. For the difficulties in evaluating outcomes, see, e.g., Watson & Do, supra note 96. 
100. See Maskus & Reichman, The Globalization of Private Knowledge Goods, supra 
note 97.  But see Gervais, supra note 93, for a more optimistic view. 
101. For measures pertaining specifically to clinical trial data, see, e.g., Timmermans, 
supra note 11, at 207-08: 
1) “Limiting the duration of data exclusivity, and/or specifying that it cannot extend 
beyond the patent term ;” 
2) “Limiting the scope of data exclusivity” to new chemical entities; 
3) Requiring rapid registration of new medicines; 
4) Allow compulsory licenses of clinical trial data; 
5) Allow waivers of data exclusivity on specified public health grounds. 
Id.  For defensive measures pertaining to other public goods, see, e.g., Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, 
TRIPS-Round II: Should Users Strike Back?, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 21 (2004); Ruth L. Okediji, 
Sustainable Access to Copyrighted Digital Information Works in Developing Countries, in 
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A 
GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME (Jerome Reichman & Keith Maskus eds., 
2005) [hereinafter Okediji, INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS]; P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ & 
RUTH L. OKEDIJI, OPEN SOCIETY INST., CONCEIVING AN INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENT 
ON LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS TO COPYRIGHT, FINAL REPORT (2008); Abbott & 
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governments will actually resort to these measures (except, perhaps, in 
the public health area) for fear of incurring retaliatory pressure from 
major economic powers.102 
Meanwhile, one government after another continues to sign these 
FTAs, and the protectionist tide, which rises with each new agreement, 
then spreads around the world via the TRIPS Agreement’s own MFN 
clause, which—unlike that of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade 1994 (“GATT 1994”)—is virtually unlimited in its sweep.103  As a 
result, the tangle of ever-tighter FTA provisions on intellectual property 
become de facto candidates for multilateral recognition in the future.104 
Within this context, numerous TRIPS-plus provisions have been 
adopted that bear on regulatory approval of generics in general and the 
use of clinical trial data in particular.105  For example, several U.S. FTAs 
introduce so-called linkage clauses, which can prevent the regulatory 
authorities from granting approval to a generic version of a drug under 
patent without the approval of the patent holder.106  These constraints 
may apply even if bioequivalence has otherwise been demonstrated.  In 
such cases, the agency responsible for safety and efficacy of drugs is 
suddenly charged with observing questions of patentability, 
infringement, and related intellectual property issues, for which it lacks 
competence.  The patent holder can short circuit both an infringement 
 
Reichman, supra note 59. 
102. For evidence of both bold measures and retaliatory pressures in the public health 
arena, see Abbott & Reichman, supra note 59, at 949-57; Brazil, Thailand Lose Trading 
Privileges in Wake of IP Disputes, Food & Drug Letter, Aug. 17, 2007 (“Two countries 
recently accused of violating pharmaceutical intellectual property (IP) rights have now lost 
certain trading privileges with the U.S.  The Bush administration removed Brazil and 
Thailand from the list of developing countries that receive duty-free treatment for certain 
exports, U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Susan Schwab announced June 28.”). 
103. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, art. 4; Mercurio, supra note 98.  See also 
ICTSD/UNCTAD, RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT (Cambridge Univ. 
Press, 2005), available at  http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/ResourceBookIndex.htm 
[hereinafter ICTSD/UNCTAD RESOURCE BOOK]. 
104. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, art. 71.1; Taubman, supra note 30, 603-04.     
105. See, e.g., Correa, NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 23, at 81-96; Pugatch, 
NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 10, at 126; Frederick M. Abbott, The Cycle of Action and 
Reaction:  Developments and Trends in Intellectual Property and Health, in NEGOTIATING 
HEALTH:  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 27-40 (Pedro Roffe et al. 
eds., 2006) [hereinafter Abbott, NEGOTIATING HEALTH]. 
106. See, e.g., Chile–U.S. FTA § 17.10.2(c), June 6, 2003, available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Chile_FTA/Final_Texts/Section_Index.html 
(accessed Jan. 18, 2009); Oman–U.S. FTA §15.9.4(a), Nov. 15, 2004 (pending 
implementation), available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Oman_FTA/Final_Text/Section_Index.html 
(accessed Jan. 18, 2009). 
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action and the generic producer’s process of marketing approval by 
reaching above their heads, so to speak.  The ability of these linkage 
provisions to block regulatory approval where enforced can thus 
sidestep many of the important flexibilities preserving state control of 
public health, including compulsory licenses.107 
With regard to test data exclusivity as such, recent FTAs seek to 
specify time periods during which the national regulatory authorities 
cannot rely on the clinical studies and data provided by originators for 
purposes of approving generic drugs on the basis of bioequivalence or 
similar standards.108  In effect, these FTAs reimpose prescribed periods 
of nonuse in the manner of the bracketed U.S.-EU proposal that was 
deleted from the draft TRIPS Agreement in 1991.109  Unless the generic 
manufacturer undertakes its own costly and wastefully duplicative 
clinical trials, which could elevate the cost of the generic substitute, it 
must sit on the sidelines for the specified period of time, usually no less 
than five years, even when there is no underlying patent on the product 
itself, as often occurs in developing countries.110 
In other words, the data exclusivity provision in FTAs with 
developing countries operates independently of any patent protection 
the originator may possess, and of any R&D costs it may otherwise have 
recouped in OECD countries.  As a result, drugs that are off patent or 
otherwise denied retroactive patent protection under TRIPS111 may 
nonetheless remain off limits to would be generic producers in 
developing countries for the specified period of marketing exclusivity.  
Under a growing number of these FTAs, the United States originator 
need not have sought to register the drug at all in the relevant country 
for marketing approval.  The drug may simply remain off the market 
altogether because the would-be local producer cannot overcome the 
data exclusivity barrier for the specified period, usually at least five 
years.112 
Other provisions in some FTAs can effectively extend the nonuse 
period by adding on another five year “waiting period.”  This result is 
 
107. See Mercurio, supra note 98, at 225-26; Correa, NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra 
note 23; Abbott, NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 105.   
108. See Mercurio, supra note 98, at 226-27; Correa, NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra 
note 23. 
109. See supra notes 68-70; supra Part C(1)(b). 
110. See Mercurio, supra note 98; Correa, Unfair Competition Under the TRIPS 
Agreement, supra note 46. 
111. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, art. 70.1. 
112. See Mercurio, supra note 98, at 227. 
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achieved by prohibiting the generic manufacturer from relying on data 
provided for regulatory approval in another country for a specified five 
year period (assuming that country requires local registration within 
that five year period).113  Such provisions enable an originator company 
to register the drug in its home country, wait five years, and then submit 
the drug for marketing approval in other FTA countries, whose generic 
industries must then wait out another five years of market exclusivity 
derived from clinical test data protection.114 
Moreover, the “new chemical entity” language used in TRIPS and 
some of the early FTAs has given way to language mandating data 
protection for any new product in recent agreements.115  Here is where 
originators of older, pre-existing products have the greatest 
opportunities to obtain exclusive marketing rights, without any new 
expenditures on R&D or clinical trials. 
The data exclusivity provisions, like the linkage provisions, can also 
be used to undermine the FTA state’s otherwise clear rights to impose 
compulsory licenses to address public health issues.  To the extent this 
tactic succeeds, it defeats the public health safeguards otherwise 
adopted by the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health,116 as well as the implementing legislation, in both a waiver and a 
pending Amendment to Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement.117  These 
multilateral flexibilities were meant to enable countries without 
manufacturing capacity to obtain needed medicines from other 
countries through back-to-back compulsory licenses.118 
Still other TRIPS-plus provisions in FTAs can directly or indirectly 
affect access to generic medicines by imposing patent term extensions, 
express limits on the power to invoke compulsory licenses, and limits on 
parallel imports.119  With specific regard to data exclusivity provisions, 
the cumulative effect of these FTAs is, as Professor Mercurio observes, 
to make “the cost of the resulting [generic] drugs . . . rise considerably as 
 
113. See, e.g., Oman–U.S. FTA, art. 15.9.1(b) (2004); Australia–U.S. FTA, art. 
17.10.1(c) (2005). 
114. See Mercurio, supra note 98, at 227-28. 
115. Id. at 228. 
116. See supra note 57; Timmermans, supra note 11; Mercurio, supra note 98, at 228-29. 
117. See supra note 58.  See also Carlos M. Correa, Bilateralism in Intellectual Property: 
Defeating the WTO System for Access to Medicines, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 79, 82 et seq. 
(2004) [hereinafter Correa, Bilateralism in Intellectual Property]. 
118. See Abbott & Reichman, supra note 59. 
119. See Mercurio, supra note 98, at 229-35; Abbott, supra note 105.  These provisions 
are beyond the scope of this Article. 
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well as [to] delay the generics introduction into the [relevant] 
marketplace.”120 
b. Recent Constraints on USTR’s Negotiating Mandate 
As explained in a previous article, the new majority in the U.S. 
Congress intervened in 2007 to modify some of the most extreme 
provisions set out in signed but theretofore unratified FTAs121 (including 
that with Colombia122).  This new template removes most of the 
language providing extraterritorial effect for the submission of 
regulatory data in the United States (and elsewhere) for 
pharmaceuticals,123 which, if properly implemented, could avoid the 
extra five year “waiting period” discussed above.  There is also some 
ambiguous language linking the term of marketing exclusivity in an 
FTA country whose generic producers rely on bioequivalence to the 
term available in the country whose approval was relied upon, under 
certain conditions.124 
Other sources report an understanding to the effect that the data 
exclusivity provisions in these still to be ratified agreements should not, 
of themselves, restrict the FTA countries’ ability to invoke compulsory 
licenses.125  This remains to be seen.  If true, its impact on previously 
 
120. Mercurio, supra note 98, at 227.  He adds that “duplication of testing is arguably 
unethical, as it simply is repetition . . . where the safety and efficacy of a product has already 
been determined.”  Id.  See also Timmermans, supra note 11.   
121. See generally Abbott & Reichman, supra note 59, at 962-65. 
122. See, e.g., U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, BIPARTISAN AGREEMENT ON TRADE 
POLICY: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (May 2007), available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Fact_Sheets/2007/ 
asset_upload_file945_11283.pdf, but note that the legislation implementing the Peru FTA was 
signed into law on December 14, 2008, United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement 
Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 110-138, 121 Stat. 1455. 
123. See Abbott & Reichman, supra note 59, at 964. 
124. See id. at 964-65. 
125. See Office of the United States Trade Representative, Trade Facts, Bipartisan 
Agreement on Trade Policy: Intellectual Property Provisions, May 2007, available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Fact_Sheets/2007/asset_upload_file312_11283.
pdf;  Brand-Name Drug Industry Alarmed At IPR Precedent of FTA Template,  INSIDE U.S. 
TRADE, May 18, 2007. 
The [bipartisan Congressional] agreement contains three main provisions: a reduced 
period of time in which generic companies are restricted from using brand-name test 
data to approve generic drugs, an end to the requirement that a foreign health 
regulator would have to certify that a generic drug does not violate a patent before 
extending marketing approval, and language giving countries the option of 
extending patent duration if a patent approval does not happen on a timely basis.  
These elements apply only to FTAs negotiated with Peru, Panama and Colombia as 
developing countries, but do not apply to the FTA with Korea as an industrialized 
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ratified FTAs must also be clarified. 
In any event, most of the provisions discussed above will remain in 
effect, depending on the particular terms of specific FTAs, regardless of 
the template applicable to agreements yet to be ratified.  A minimum 
period of five years’ marketing exclusivity can thus generally be 
expected,126 with the consequences discussed above.  Moreover, the U.S. 
FTAs, which operate in favor of the European Union and other 
countries by dint of the MFN clause of TRIPS,127 may be further 
reinforced by the European Union’s own bilateral trade agreements—
so-called European Partnership Agreements (“EPAs”)—which may add 
serious enforcement obligations to the normative provisions under 
review.128 
Developing countries that enter into FTAs with the United States or 
into EPAs with the European Union along the lines of those currently 
proposed will thus be constrained “to provide a very strong market 
dominant position for pharmaceutical originator companies, and . . . to 
create substantial obstacles to the introduction of generic products.”129  
Among these obstacles, the market exclusivity provisions attributable to 
clinical test data remain particularly troubling. 
D. A Missed Opportunity: The Cost-Sharing Alternative 
Sad as this survey of FTA provisions is, it becomes even sadder to 
think that a better negotiating strategy, if adopted early on, might at 
least have attenuated some of the potential harm to public health and 
consumers documented above.  To this end, the developing countries 
might have counter-offered some measure of added protection for 
clinical trial data when negotiating FTAs without acquiescing in the 
exclusive rights model.  A logical alternative would have been to 
recognize the alleged “free rider” problem by acquiescing in a 
reasonable royalty for use of the originator’s clinical trial data during a 




126. See Abbott & Reichman, supra note 59, at 964. 
127. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
128. See Abbott & Reichman, supra note 59, at 965-69. 
129. Id. at 969. 
130. This strategy was first proposed by Reichman in meetings at Bellagio, Italy and 
New Delhi, India and quickly endorsed by James Love and Robert Weissman.  See 
Reichman, NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 23, at 145; Robert Weissman, Data 
Protection: Options for Implementation, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH:  INTELLECTUAL 
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to pesticides and fertilizers.131  Such an approach would have invoked 
the concept of “liability rules”—that is, take and pay rules—rather than 
exclusive property rights, which require the owner’s consent to specified 
uses of the property in question.132 
1. An Early U.S. Proposal Envisioned a Liability Rule 
In the late 1980s, the United States multilateral trade negotiators 
had submitted a proposal that required nonuse of trade secrets 
“submitted to carry out governmental functions” or for “commercial or 
competitive benefit” of either the government or third parties “except 
with the right holder’s consent, on payment of the reasonable value of 
use”133 or if a reasonable period of exclusive use was given the right 
holder.  The initial United States position thus appeared willing to 
consider a cost-sharing or “liability rule” approach, based on 
compensatory royalties, as an alternative to the exclusive property right 
approach embodied in NAFTA. This proposal would have been 
consistent with some pre-existing American practice with regard to test 
data for fertilizers and pesticides, which obtain a period of data 
exclusivity followed by another period of free use by any second comer 
who pays equitable compensation.134 
If this approach were applied to clinical trials for medicines, it would 
enable governments and generic producers to rely upon both test data 
and positive regulatory outcomes elsewhere in order to market 
equivalent or competing products otherwise permitted under 
international intellectual property law, “provided that the second 
 
PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 151-78 (Pedro Roffe et al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter 
Weissman, NEGOTIATING HEALTH]; James Love, Four Practical Measures to Enhance 
Access to Medical Technologies, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH:  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 241-56 (Pedro Roffe et al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter Love, 
NEGOTIATING HEALTH].  See, most recently, Aaron X. Fellmeth, Secrecy, Monopoly, and 
Access to Pharmaceuticals in International Trade Law:  Protection of Marketing Approval 
Data Under the TRIPS Agreement, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 443 (2004); Taubman, supra note 30, 
at 598. 
131. See U.S. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rotenticide Act [hereinafter FIFRA], 
7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136(y) (2004). 
132. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and 
Inalienability:  One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972); Jerome H. 
Reichman, Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in Subpatentable 
Innovation, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1743 (2000) [hereinafter Reichman, Of Green Tulips]. 
133. Reichman, NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 23, at 144-45 (citing authorities).  
See also Weissman, NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 130. 
134. See FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136(y) (2004); Weissman, NEGOTIATING HEALTH, 
supra note 130. 
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comers paid a reasonable royalty to the data originators to help defray 
their costs of R&D.”135  Such an approach would address any perceived 
free rider problem that arises from the enormous costs of conducting 
clinical trials for new pharmaceutical products under existing FDA 
standards, without creating barriers to entry or other anti-competitive 
effects flowing from the inability of local governments to implement the 
flexibilities that the TRIPS Agreement makes available. 
Notwithstanding these advantages, no cost-sharing proposals 
appeared in the FTAs concluded with the United States before 2007, 
nor, until recently, was there evidence that developing countries had 
seriously put such proposals forward.  One reason is that acceptance of 
a cost-sharing approach would arguably diminish the victory achieved in 
obtaining the so-called “misappropriation approach,” embodied in 
Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement as it stands, which the foregoing 
analysis suggests lacks teeth.  Other objections are that brand name 
companies already obtain enough compensation from the patent system 
generally and that, in developing countries, the consumer interest in 
low-priced medicines outweighs the brand name company’s claim to 
additional compensation for generating data.136 
The problem with this position is that resistance to the exclusive 
rights model has largely failed.  Governments that are eager to sign 
FTAs thus find themselves saddled with ever harsher exclusive rights 
clauses without even attempting to fall back on counter proposals 
sounding in compensatory liability principles. 
Recently, however, the Korean government successfully negotiated 
a cost-sharing clause for clinical trial data in its Free Trade Agreement 
with the European Free Trade Association (“EFTA”) countries,137 
 
135. Reichman, NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 23, at 145. 
136. Cf. Kevin Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage: Balancing Access and Innovation 
in International Prescription Drug Markets, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 193, 197 
(2005) (arguing the case for deviations from stringent intellectual property law and policies to 
“permit . . . the broadest possible dissemination of pharmaceutical innovation” in poor 
countries). 
137. See Annex XIII (Article 3) to the EFTA-Korea FTA, available at 
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/fta/agreements/eftakorfta.pdf: 
The Parties shall protect undisclosed information in accordance with Article 39 of 
the TRIPS Agreement. The Parties shall prevent applicants for marketing approval 
for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products from relying on undisclosed 
test or other undisclosed data, the origination of which involves a considerable 
effort, submitted by the first applicant to the competent authority for marketing 
approval for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products, utilizing new 
chemical entities, for an adequate number of years from the date of approval, except 
where approval is sought for original products. Any Party may instead allow in their 
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although this Agreement has not yet been implemented in practice.  The 
Indian government is also reportedly exploring the compensatory 
liability approach as one of several options, while otherwise resisting 
data exclusivity in ongoing negotiations with USTR.138  If the Indian 
Government eventually threw its weight behind this compromise 
approach, it might inspire other Asian governments to follow its lead.139  
For this reason, it is worth exploring further how such an option might 
be implemented in practice. 
2. Implementing a Compensatory Liability Regime 
Acting on this author’s previous proposals,140 Robert Weissman and 
James Love began working on more detailed implementing strategies.141  
As Weissman convincingly argued, developing countries are finding that 
the misappropriation approach is not a viable negotiating posture, 
despite its solid grounding in the TRIPS text and legislative history.  “In 
contrast, the cost-sharing approach can give developing countries 
something to offer that may undercut demands for data exclusivity by 
addressing the underlying basis for any claims to reward brand name 
companies for conducting clinical tests.”142 
Moreover, by counter-offering with a liability rule, developing 
 
national legislation applicants to rely on such data if the first applicant is adequately 
compensated. 
Id. (emphasis added).  EFTA has reportedly made this option a standard practice in their 
FTA negotiations.  See ICTSD/UNCTAD RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 103. 
138. However, such an option does not appear in SATWANT REDDY & GURDIAL 
SINGH SANDHU, REPORT ON STEPS TO BE TAKEN BY GOVERNMENT OF INDIA IN THE 
CONTEXT OF DATA PROTECTION PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 39.3 OF TRIPS AGREEMENT, 
INDIA MINISTRY OF CHEMICALS AND FERTILIZERS (MAY 31, 2007).  According to the 
Government of India, “[t]he Department of Health & Family Welfare would give wide 
publicity to the recommendations in the Report and carry out consultations with stakeholders 
before proposing appropriate amendments to Drugs & Cosmetics Act 1940 and its Rules.”  
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF CHEMICALS & FERTILIZERS, DEPT. OF CHEMICALS 
AND PETROCHEMICALS ANNUAL REPORT, 2007-2008 §2.44(c), available at 
http://chemicals.nic.in/AREng0708.pdf.  Nonetheless, India continues to resist data 
exclusivity as of April 2008.  See, USTR pushes for drug data protection, THE TIMES OF 
INDIA, April 15, 2008. 
139. See generally, Jerome H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in the Twenty-First 
Century:  Will Asia Lead or Follow?, Paper Presented at the Conference on the Changing 
Role of Intellectual Property in Asia:  Moving Beyond Producers and Consumers, University 
of Illinois (March 1, 2008). 
140. See supra notes 130 & 132. 
141. Weissman, NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 130; Judit Rius Sanjuan, James 
Love & Robert Weissman, A Cost-Sharing Model to Protect Investments in Pharmaceutical 
Test Data, CPTech Pol’y Brief No. 1, April 3, 2006 (rev. ed., May 18, 2006). 
142. Weissman, NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 130. 
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country negotiators could leverage the fact that U.S. law already 
establishes a version of this cost-sharing approach for agricultural 
chemical compound registration, under the Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”).143  Under this regime, as 
explained by Weissman, “[a]fter the expiration of an exclusivity period, 
generic entrants [would] have an automatic right to use registration 
data.  Disputes over compensation will not delay generic entrance and 
are resolved while generic firms are on the market.”144 
Consistent with these premises, Weissman suggests language to 
implement a “cost-sharing approach.”145  His method quite literally 
focuses on the actual cost of producing the data, usually in Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) markets, 
where the data originator seeks first marketing approval.  The amount 
to be paid an originator company would result from evidence of (1) the 
verifiable costs of the tests or data, (2) “a reasonable estimate of the 
country’s likely share of the global market,” and (3) “the amount of 
global revenue the product has generated to date, and in the previous 12 
months.”146  Actual costs may also reflect a risk premium to cover 
possible failures in initial testing over time and some compensation for 
the benefit of early market entry (as compared to the amount of time 
needed in case of independent replication of clinical trials).147 
Weissman’s approach would thus seek to determine the 
proportionate global market share to be allocated to generic 
competitors on the basis of market size.  One problem with it is the risk 
 
143. This Act states: 
The [Environmental Protection Agency] administrator, without the permission of 
the original data submitter, [may] consider any item of data [cited] in support of an 
application by another person . . . if the applicant has made an offer to compensate 
the original data submitter. . . .  [T]he terms and amount of compensation may be 
fixed by an agreement between the original data submitter and the applicant, or 
failing such an agreement, binding arbitration. 
FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(F)(iii), supra note 45.  But note that liability for equitable 
compensation can only occur in the five years after the original ten-year period of complete 
exclusivity of § 136a(c)(1)(F)(i) (which can be extended to thirteen years total under § 
136a(c)(1)(F)(ii)). 
144. See Weissman, NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 130, at 151-78; cf. Reichman, 
Of Green Tulips, supra note 132. 
145. See id., at 162-63.  Weissman’s proposals would deny compensation for use of data 
pertaining to products covered by patents and they impose an upper limit on the multiple of 
actual costs that originators may recoup.  Weissman also acknowledges that, under FIFRA, 
U.S. arbitrators are willing to consider a “risk premium” to reflect the costs of testing that 
result in unapproved products.  See id. at 157, Box 9.2. 
146. Sanjuan, Love & Weissman, supra note 141, at 8-9. 
147. See ICTSD/UNCTAD RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 103, § 3.3.2, at 538. 
REVISED REICHMAN FINAL 3-9-09 3/9/2009  2:26 PM 
34 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:1 
 
of overcompensation, although this factor itself depends on whether one 
views the demand for payment as merely a form of compensation for 
lost revenue or, alternatively, as a form of regulatory reward over and 
above the patent system.148  Viewed as compensation for lost revenues, 
Weissman proposes caps on the aggregate amount of revenue to be 
recovered, and he would disallow any compensation at all if the 
originator company held a valid patent on the product in the relevant 
territory.  In other words, Weissman sees compensation as a viable 
claim only when, for one reason or another, the originator company had 
failed to obtain a relevant patent in the country at issue.149 
One may doubt that negotiators in developing countries could 
actually obtain such caps, in part because originator companies may 
already receive double compensation in the European Union and the 
United States (depending on the circumstances), in which case they 
would be recognizing an inconsistent principle abroad.  Moreover, 
Weissman’s approach, based on market size, does not directly assess the 
relative capacity to pay of the country in question. 
Since Weissman’s initial proposals in 2003, Professor Aaron 
Fellmeth has devised an elegant but still more complicated set of 
“fairness” formulas drawing on the law and economics literature.150 
Fellmeth analyzes several different models, including a “Simple 
Divisions Royalties Model” and a more refined “Re-adjustable 
Royalties Model.”  The latter takes into account such factors as the 
initial costs of R&D, the time value of money, the number of 
participants in the scheme, and their ability to pay. 
One problem with both of these approaches is that determining the 
true costs of pharmaceutical R&D for any purpose, especially drug price 
appraisals or negotiations, has proved a daunting task never 
satisfactorily resolved to date.151  A fortiori, developing countries’ 
authorities would face major difficulties in determining R&D costs 
accruing on the part of the data originator.  Even if this variable were 
established with some degree of credibility, it would remain nearly 
 
148. See supra note 49; infra note 181 and accompanying text (discussing views of Prof. 
Rebecca Eisenberg). 
149. Weissman, NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 130, at 157.  Even this approach 
begs the question of how much “compensation” or “reward” had been obtained in other 
countries. 
150. See Fellmeth, supra note 130, at 478-500. 
151. For a noteworthy illustration of the difficulties by an OECD task force, see 
OECD, PHARMACEUTICAL PRICING POLICIES IN A GLOBAL MARKET (2008) (Executive 
Summary), available at http://www.oecd.org. 
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impossible to determine how much of the expenses attributable to data 
incurred by the originator company had in fact been recouped or 
exceeded in developed country markets. 
For this reason, a simpler approach may prove more desirable, if 
only to avoid litigation and other transaction costs.  On this approach, a 
reasonable royalty model could be adopted instead, which would oblige 
generic producers to pay a flat percentage of gross sales, or a flat 
percentage above marginal costs of production, as a tithe for the right to 
rely on the originators’ test data results for a specified period of time, to 
last no longer than five years.  On this approach, the compensation to be 
paid is linked to the value of the data to each company, as reflected in 
the resulting sales.152  Given that Canada used to impose a standard four 
percent royalty on a license of right to use patented pharmaceuticals 
until 1992,153 one could envision that figure as an outer limit, one that 
also indirectly takes account of the fact that many originator companies 
will already have recouped the bulk of their R&D expenses in 
developed countries anyway.  However, if relative ability to pay were 
factored in, as would be desirable, the reasonable royalties could range 
from, say, one to four percent, depending on where a given country fell 
in the per capita GDP poverty index. 
The principal disadvantage of this approach is that it would give only 
an approximation of the originator’s true R&D costs.  For that and 
other reasons,154  it could be seen as “overcompensation,” all the more 
so in that revenues obtained in developed markets are pocketed without 
regard to these accounts.  However, intellectual property law is 
accustomed to such approximations, which in this case have the twin 
virtues of avoiding the quixotic hunt for “true” costs (and the related 
litigation costs certain to ensue) and of finessing the conceptual debate 
about “rewards” versus “compensation,” to be examined below. 
 
152. Sanjuan, Love & Weissman, supra note 141, at 7, 9, have also endorsed this 
scheme in the alternative.  They note that some FIFRA arbitrators have used this approach in 
connection with agricultural test data. Id. at 7 (noting possible adjustments for risk of 
investment and cost of capital). See also In the Matter of the Arbitration Between Microgen, 
Inc. and Lonza, Inc., Arbitrator’s Decision and Award, Docket No.: 23-171-00003-96, Before 
the American Arbitration Association, May 10, 2000. 
153. See JEROME H. REICHMAN WITH CATHERINE HASENZAHL, NON–VOLUNTARY 
LICENSING OF PATENTED INVENTIONS:  THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE (ICTSD, Geneva, 
October 2002), available at 
http://www.ictsd.org/pubs/ictsd_series/prs/cs_reichman_hasenzahl.pdf.  This figure rose to six 
percent in some cases decided in the 1990s. 
154. Sanjuan, Love & Weissman, supra note 141, at 9, also suggest a royalty based on 
four percent of net sales of the generic product as a baseline indicator, if this alternative were 
adopted. 
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Suffice it to say that, in a world where private pharmaceutical 
companies continue to labor under the duty to supply clinical test data 
as a de facto public good, their efforts to coerce generic competitors to 
share that burden against their will are probably more efficiently 
discharged by a simple liability rule based on a reasonable royalty than 
by a true cost-sharing formula.  The deeper questions concern the need 
to rationalize the process by which this essential public good is to be 
produced in the first place, a topic that this Article will soon address in 
depth. 
II. RETHINKING THE ROLE OF CLINICAL TRIAL DATA REGIMES 
A. The Flawed Logic of Marketing Exclusivity 
The foregoing discussion shows that “marketing exclusivity” (as the 
protection of clinical test data is called in the United States) or “data 
exclusivity” (as it is labeled in the European Union)155 has become an 
increasingly accepted alternative to patents.  While there has been 
considerable discussion in both the United States and the European 
Union about the modalities of implementing this de facto sui generis 
intellectual property regime and about the benefits of transnational 
harmonization of these modalities, there has been relatively little deep 
analysis of the logic, nature, or validity of the regime itself, as an 
institution of domestic and global intellectual property law.156   
1. Evaluating the Incentive Rationale 
Partly, this inattention to fundamentals may stem from the 
regulatory nature of the regime in the United States, which to some 
extent has shielded it from the more intense public scrutiny likely to 
accompany intellectual property bills that must wend their way through 
congressional committees.157  While considerable public debate was 
generated in the European Union when the initial EC Directive of 1986 
was replaced with a revised and consolidated Directive of 2001,158 this 
 
155. Junod, supra note 9, at 502. 
156. For efforts to raise awareness of the relevant issues, see Scafidi, supra note 23, and 
Timmermans, supra note 11.  See also Taubman, supra note 30. 
157. However, recent proposals to extend long-term data exclusivity to biologics have 
generated intense public debate.  See, e.g., Jessica R. Underwood, What the EU Has That the 
U.S. Wants:  An Analysis of Potential Regulatory Systems for Follow-On Biologics in the 
United States, 10 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 419, 441-51 (2007). 
158. Council Directive 87/21, 1987 O.J. (L 015) 36-37 (EC), amending Council 
Directive 65/65, 1965 O.J. (L 22) 369 (EC); Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 6 November 2001 on the Community Code relating to Medicinal 
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debate seems to have largely focused on implementation issues in 
regard to efforts that attempted to rationalize problems arising in the 
past.159 The European Commission’s revised Directive of 2004 expressly 
aimed to increase incentives to offset the competitive decline of the EU 
pharmaceutical sector with respect to the U.S. sector at the turn of the 
century.160  In the absence of searching economic, philosophic, or 
systematic legal analysis, at least until recently,161 the discussion has 
often taken the largely unelaborated need for an additional incentive 
mechanism for granted.  Over time, this “need” has acquired an aura of 
inevitability as the institution itself spreads from country to country and 
region to region under the auspices of FTAs,162 with the diabolical 
multiplier effect of the TRIPS Agreement’s MFN provision.163 
Congress originally justified the introduction of marketing 
exclusivity as a device for encouraging “the development and testing of 
unpatentable pharmaceuticals.”164  Among the concerns known at the 
time were the uncertain status of biotechnological inventions and 
second uses of patented medicines (i.e., new therapeutic indications of 
known compounds), both of which categories subsequently obtained a 
more solid status in U.S. and EU patent law.165  Over time, this 
 
Products for Human Use, OJ EC, 28 Nov., L311/67. 
159.  Junod, supra note 9, at 502-17. 
160. Directive 2004/27/EC, supra note 46, art. 10; Pugatch, NEGOTIATING HEALTH, 
supra note 10, at 105-08 (describing “8+2+1 formula” of the current regulation, also including 
a Bolar-type provision allowing experimental reverse-engineering of the patented molecule 
for purposes of marketing approval before expiry of the patent). 
161. For a critical analysis, see, e.g., Correa, Unfair Competition Under the TRIPS 
Agreement, supra note 46; Reichman, NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 23.  For a 
profound enquiry that recognizes the many different and contradictory interests at stake, see 
Taubman, supra note 30.  For a favorable analysis on economic grounds, see, e.g., Fellmeth, 
supra note 130, and Rebecca Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345 (2007).  But see Ariel Katz, Pharmaceutical Lemons:  
Innovation and Regulation in the Drug Industry, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1 
(2007).  See also Skillington & Solovy, supra note 20. 
162. See, e.g., Taubman, supra note 30, at 601-04. 
163. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, art. 4 (no exception for regional trade 
agreements as under GATT). 
164. See Allergan Inc. v. Alcon Labs., 324 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 
540 U.S. 1048 (2003) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 29 (1984), reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2647-48). 
165. Junod, supra note 9, at 484-86.  However, the systematization of biotechnology in 
European patent law took much longer than in the United States and was not settled until the 
Biotech Directive of 1998.  See Council Directive 98/44, 1998 O.J. (L 213) 13-21 (EC).  
Presumably, data exclusivity helped fill this gap in the European Union.  As for second uses, 
see Richard F. Kingham & Grant H. Castle, Data and Marketing Exclusivity for 
Pharmaceuticals in the European Community, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 209, 223 (2000) on this 
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“supplementary incentive” rationale has been applied to 
pharmaceuticals whose effective patent life was shortened by lengthy 
delays for regulatory approval,166 to so-called orphan drugs,167 and most 
recently, to biologics (large-molecule biogenetic pharmaceuticals), 
which may require protracted and risky clinical trials and whose 
suitability for bioequivalent generic manufacturing remains 
controversial.168 
Marketing exclusivity as a provider of substitute compensation for 
undertaking the costs and risks of clinical trials has also been used to 
justify tough FTA provisions affecting the developing countries, where 
many existing pharmaceutical patents were not yet recognized under the 
TRIPS Agreement for one reason or another.169  This reasoning echoes 
one of the early justifications in the European Union, when some 
member countries—such as Spain and Portugal—did not grant 
pharmaceutical patents at all.170  But these justifications appear weak in 
that all countries (except a few Least-Developed Countries) must now 
protect pharmaceutical inventions (created after 2005 at the latest);171 
while the notion that the European Commission and Council should 
supplement national public health schemes premised on price controls 
by imposing data exclusivity provisions raises both constitutional 
questions and concerns about regulatory capture that lie beyond the 
scope of this Article. 
Viewed as a gap-filling alternative to patents rooted in the incentive 
rationale, the data exclusivity regimes reveal a number of internal 
contradictions that critics have pointed out.  For example, the inability 
to patent any given pharmaceutical may indicate relatively low public 
 
point. 
166. Eisenberg, supra note 49, at 351-59. 
167. See Grabowski, Increasing R&D Incentives, supra note 19, at 458-59. 
168. Grabowski, Data Exclusivity, supra note 54; Abbott, NEGOTIATING HEALTH, 
supra note 105. 
169. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, art. 70 (no retroactivity; no pipeline; only a 
mailbox for new patents during transitional phase; plus a market exclusivity requirement for 
patents in the mailbox unrelated to clinical test data).  See also Taubman, supra note 30, at 
596 (stressing free-rider problem), 597-98 (contrasting developing countries’ demands for 
protection of traditional knowledge with their denial of claims for “misappropriation” of 
clinical test data). 
170. Junod, supra note 9, at 502 (citing James Love, TACD on Pharmaceutical 
Registration Data Exclusivity (Draft), available at 
http://www.essentialdrugs.org/edrug/archive/200001/msg00075.php). 
171. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, arts. 27, 65.1, 65.4, 66.1 (plus later extensions), 
70; Abbott & Reichman, supra note 59, at 928-29, 975-76, 976 n.239 (noting exemption of 
LDCs from duty to provide patent protection of pharmaceuticals until 1 January 2016). 
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health utility, as when minor improvements are made to an existing 
patent, often as an excuse to prolong or “evergreen” that same patented 
product.172  More generally, the number of unpatented products 
attracting data exclusivity at any given time seems relatively small in 
relation to the total number of products—patented or not—that are 
similarly protected.173  As a result, so much double compensation seems 
built into a sui generis right that applies across the board to both 
patented and unpatented medicines that, even if one buys into the 
notion that two conceptually distinct incentives are at issue,174 it tends to 
obviate the validity of the distinction in practice. 
However, these arguments are not necessarily conclusive.  Some 
incremental improvements may elicit big therapeutic benefits without 
attracting patent protection in some jurisdictions, especially those that 
resist product patents for new uses of known substances.  Conversely, 
even new chemical entities that do meet patentability standards may 
yield relatively minor advances in therapeutic benefits.  To the extent 
that a marketing exclusivity regime provides needed incentives at all—
admittedly a serious question—it could validly perform that function in 
certain cases, especially if the relation to patent duration were 
“capped,” as was permitted under the first EC Directive,175 or if the 
short term of duration—five years in the United States176—made it 
unlikely to extend beyond the term of patent protection, where it exists, 
in most cases. 
In this same vein, one must also factor in the potential social costs of 
the drive for so-called “quality patents,” which seems likely to elevate 
the very low nonobviousness standard in the United States during the 
1990s to higher, more stringent levels, especially after the Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in the KSR case of 2007.177  To the extent that 
more incremental improvements to existing pharmaceuticals were 
denied patents on grounds of obviousness in the future, the marketing 
 
172. Junod, supra note 9, at 495. 
173. See, e.g., id., at 487-88.  In the period 1998 to February 2004, 27 out of 137 FDA 
approved drugs were developed without “substantial patent protection.”  Id. at 487. 
174. See, e.g., Taubman, supra note 30. 
175. Council Directive 87/21, supra note 158, discussed in Junod, supra note 9, at 503. 
176. 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 355(3)(E)(ii), 355(5)(F)(ii) (2008). 
177. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 1727 (2007). “[A]s progress beginning 
from higher levels of achievement is expected in the normal course, the results of ordinary 
innovation are not the subject of exclusive rights under the patent laws.  Were it otherwise 
patents might stifle, rather than promote, the progress of useful arts.”  Id. at 1746.  See 
Symposium, Nonobviousness—The Shape of Things to Come, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
323 (2008). 
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exclusivity regime for clinical trials could increasingly supply the sole 
incentives for overcoming the risk of market failure for an ever-
widening class of pharmaceuticals that, in the past, had sometimes 
proved to yield surprising therapeutic benefits.  Occasionally, indeed, it 
is the second or third variation on a common medical theme that gets it 
right from the standpoint of optimal delivery.178  Absent alternative 
incentives, this type of innovation could become progressively less 
attractive to venture capital under a more rigorous nonobvious 
standard.  Moreover, according to Professor Henry Grabowski,179 the 
long incubation period for biologics, and the corresponding risk of 
Phase III clinical test failures, puts the breakeven point so high that 
investors want Congress to deliberately extend market exclusivity 
beyond effective patent life as an inducement to risk averse venture 
capitalists180 (although this camp conveniently omits any mention of the 
government funds pouring into this same field). 
My point is that the incentive rationale for market exclusivity, 
although usually overstated in its conventional form, has just enough 
legs or legitimacy in enough circumstances that it must be addressed 
head on, and not entirely dismissed out of hand as an irrelevant 
appendage to the patent system.  Recently, moreover, the incentive 
rationale has been given a new twist by a distinguished authority that 
arguably reinforces any legitimacy it otherwise possessed.  Professor 
Rebecca Eisenberg argues that market exclusivity is part of an 
interrelated group of regulatory provisions that not only force drug 
companies to conduct clinical trials and submit results to independent 
experts, they positively stimulate producers to conduct more and better 
trials than they otherwise would be inclined to do, which redounds to 
the benefit of the overall innovation process.181  Like Professor 
Grabowski in regard to biologics, Professor Eisenberg thus sees value in 
strengthening the incentives that flow from data exclusivity, as distinct 
from patents, to improve the quality of clinical trials.  But she would 
 
178. For example, see Genentech’s patent application in Europe for “the intermittent 
administration of insulin-like growth factor (IGF) I to avoid tachyphylaxis (rapid loss of drug 
efficacy with continued use) during the treatment of a chronic disease[.]”  Mary Ann Liebert, 
Genentech’s Method of Using Growth Factor May Be Patentable in Europe, 25 BIOTECH. L. 
REP. 18 (2006). 
179. See Grabowski, Data Exclusivity, supra note 54. 
180. Id.  See also Henry Grabowski, David Ridley & Kevin Schulman, Entry and 
Competition in Generic Biologics, 28 MANAGE. DECIS. ECON. 439, 440 (2007).  But the extent 
to which the costs of trials for biologics greatly exceed that of small molecules has not been 
conclusively established. 
181. Eisenberg, supra note 49, at 366-87. 
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impose the condition that these extra benefits must also result in much 
greater disclosure and transparency with regard to clinical test results 
than currently occurs, which, in her view, could greatly reduce the 
aggregate costs of conducting clinical trials.182 
Needless to say, there are more problems with these arguments than 
we have space to address here.  For example, Ariel Katz suggests that 
positive clinical trial results already perform such a crucial 
“certification” guarantee against “lemons” that pharmaceutical 
companies ought to be grateful for the opportunity to shoulder the 
costs, heavy as they may be.183  More tellingly, the apologists for 
marketing exclusivity seldom mention the almost thirty billion dollars a 
year184 of federal funds that the National Institutes of Health (“NIH”) 
spend on upstream research in order to reduce the enormous risks 
inherent in early stage medical research.185 Because this federal funding 
policy often leaves only the downstream research burdens to the 
pharmaceutical companies, especially the so-called “billion dollar 
barrier” of clinical trials,186 it is largely the costs of clinical trials that 
justifies strong pharmaceutical patents—and correspondingly high 
pharmaceutical prices—in the first place.   
Given that the originator pharmaceutical companies themselves 
never cease reminding us of this fact when justifying the benefits of 
existing patent law against reforms desired by other industries, 
especially the information technology sector,187 arguments that focus on 
the need for ever greater incentives for clinical trials as such often have 
a hollow ring to them.  They enable the originator companies to have it 
both ways, without accounting for the excess profits that overlapping 
regimes can yield in many, if not most cases. 
 
182. Id. at 380-85; see most recently, Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and Public Health: 
The Significance of Data Exclusivity, paper presented to the Workshop on Trade Secrecy, 
Conference of the Engelberg Center on Innovation, Law and Policy, NYU Law School 
(February 20-21, 2009). 
183. Katz, supra note 161. 
184. Health Issues and Opportunities at NIH:  Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. Labor, 
Health and Human Services, Education Appropriations (2008) (testimony of Elias A. 
Zerhouni, M.D., Director, NIH), available at http://appropriations.senate.gov//2008_07_16_-
Labor-_Testimony_of_Dr_Elias_ A_Zerhouni _at_the_July_16_NIH_Hearing.pdf. 
185. See, e.g., Rai et al., Pathways Across the Valley of Death, supra note 44, at 4. 
186. DiMasi et al., supra note 5, at 181 (“Assuming the same growth rates . . . per 
approved drug for R&D relevant to approvals in 2001 . . . capitalized pre-approval cost would 
be US$ 1.1 billion.”). 
187. Arti K. Rai, Building a Better Innovation System:  Combining Facially Neutral 
Patent Standards with Regulation of End Product Therapeutics, forthcoming in the HOUSTON 
L. REV., available at   http://ssrn.com/abstract=1160198. 
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Nevertheless, to the extent that the incentive rationale for data 
exclusivity has some legs or legitimacy in at least a narrow range of 
cases, it gives rise to two fundamental questions.  First, is a sui generis 
exclusive property right the proper way to provide the kind of 
additional incentives said to be needed?  A second and more profound 
question is, if clinical trials are such an essential public good that we 
must scrape the bottom of the intellectual property barrel to stimulate 
the private sector to provide it adequately, why do we insist on charging 
that sector with this task in the first place? 
2. Why a Sui Generis Exclusive Property Right? 
However strong or weak the case for an incentive rationale to justify 
clinical data generation may be, policymakers take a big leap of faith 
when they uncritically seek to address this need by means of a sui 
generis exclusive property right.  Historically, such regimes have 
compiled a dismal record as legislators shift between copyright-like and 
patent-like regimes over time.188  These hybrid regimes typically 
generate unintended effects of under or over protection without ever 
satisfactorily resolving the underlying problems of market failure.  
Conceptually, moreover, patent-like sui generis regimes inevitably 
harbor irresolvable economic contradictions with the mature patent 
paradigm, which never go away.189 
Consider that the patent law allows an invention to escape the 
discipline of free competition only because the inventor has contributed 
a new and useful technical achievement that routine engineers operating 
in the relevant field could not themselves have developed.190  By 
disclosing such an invention to the public in return for a legal monopoly, 
the inventor helps to elevate the existing state of competition to its next 
 
188. See, e.g., Jerome H. Reichman, Symposium, Design Protection and the New 
Technologies:  The United States Experience in a Transnational Perspective, 19 U. BALT. L. 
REV. 6 (1990); Jerome H. Reichman, Design Protection After the Copyright Act of 1976:  A 
Comparative View of the Emerging Interim Models, 31 J. COPYRIGHT SOC. USA 267 (1984); 
Jerome H. Reichman, Design Protection in Domestic and Foreign Copyright Law:  From the 
Berne Revision of 1948 to the Copyright Act of 1976, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1143. 
189. See, e.g., Jerome H. Reichman, Symposium, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and 
Copyright Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2432 (1994) [hereinafter Reichman, Legal 
Hybrids]; Jerome H. Reichman, Charting the Collapse of the Patent-Copyright Dichotomy:  
Premises for a Restructured International Intellectual Property System, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 475 (1995); Mark D. Janis, Second Tier Patent Protection, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 151 
(1999). 
190. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 1727 (2007); Wal-Mart Stores v. 
Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205 (2000); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964) 
and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964) (Sears-Compco Doctrine). 
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highest level.191  Given these premises, however, the practice of 
extending patent-like exclusive rights, with all the social costs they 
entail, to “sweat of the brow” research results that fail the test of 
nonobviousness will not withstand either logical or economic analysis.192   
However important their public health functions certainly are, 
clinical trial results merely improve upon existing technological know-
how, without adding an inventive step to the prior art.  The sui generis 
intellectual property right in question thus protects investment as such, 
not a technological achievement.  Using exclusive property rights that 
block second comers for this purpose blurs the boundaries between 
rights holders193 and risks generating exorbitant social costs,194 unless 
there is no other way to attain the desired public health goals of safety 
and efficacy. 
To avoid these conceptual errors, I have long urged policymakers to 
sharpen the distinction between exclusive rights that aim to stimulate 
technological progress and alternative measures that aim to protect 
investments as such.195  This distinction is particularly important in cases 
where second comers may too easily capture the fruits of investment by 
avoiding or circumventing the cost structure that legitimate competitors 
must otherwise defray.196  In such cases, addressing the risk of 
diminished investment by first movers ideally calls for a pro-competitive 
 
191. See Michael Lehmann, Property and Intellectual Property--Property Rights as 
Restrictions on Competition in Furtherance of Competition, 20 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & 
COPYRIGHT L. 1 (1989). 
192. Reichman, Of Green Tulips, supra note 132, at 1755 (discussing problem of 
cumulative and sequential innovation). 
193. See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE:  HOW 
JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 88-89 (Princeton Univ. 
Press 2008); Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 
75 TEXAS L. REV. 989 (1997); Reichman & Dreyfuss, Harmonization Without Consensus, 
supra note 91, at 102-22. 
194. See, e.g., MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY:  HOW TOO MUCH 
OWNERSHIP WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES (Basic Books 
2008).  Cf. also Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? 
The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998). 
195. See, e.g., Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 189; Reichman, Of Green Tulips, 
supra note 132. 
196. See, e.g., Jerome H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights 
in Data?, 50 VAND. L. REV. 51 (1997); Jerome H. Reichman, Database Protection in a Global 
Economy, 2002 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT ECONOMIQUE 455-504; Pamela 
Samuelson, Randall Davis, Mitchell D. Kapor, & Jerome H. Reichman, A Manifesto 
Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308 (1994).  See 
also Leo Raskind, The Misappropriation Doctrine as a Competitive Norm of Intellectual 
Property Law, 75 MINN. L. REV. 875 (1991). 
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remedy that compensates for the losses from undisciplined free-riding 
without creating barriers to entry for second comers willing to recognize 
the first comer’s contribution when themselves investing in follow-on 
activities.197 
By focusing attention on the need to protect investment, rather than 
on stimulating a particular level of technical achievement, policymakers 
concerned about market failures would logically weigh the relative costs 
and benefits of liability rules,198 that is “take now and pay later” rules,199 
against those of sui generis exclusive property regimes.200  In this vein, I 
have elsewhere proposed a “compensatory liability regime” that would 
allow the first innovator a short period of immunity from wholesale 
duplication, followed by a brief but relatively longer period in which 
follow-on improvers could freely enter the market by paying a 
reasonable royalty to the first comer in exchange for the privilege of 
adding onto his or her initial contribution.201  In such cases, one may 
view the second comer’s compensatory royalties either as a pro rata 
contribution to the first comer’s costs or as the product of a de facto 
partnership between the innovator, who took the first investment risk, 
and the second comer, who improves upon the former’s technical 
outcome.202 
 
197. This, of course, was the logic of traditional trade secret law itself, which conferred 
only “take and pay” remedies in the sense that those who misappropriated another’s secret 
know-how by dishonest means had to repay the saved costs of reverse engineering by honest 
means.  See RESTATEMENT (3D) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 45 (1995); Reichman, Legal 
Hybrids, supra note 189; Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics 
of Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575 (2002). 
198. See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 132.   
199. See, e.g., Robert Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property 
Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1302 (1996). 
200. See EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE 84-97 (2007) 
(“Blue Skies” Scenario), available at http://www.epo.org /topics/patent-system/scenarios-for-
the-future.html. 
201. See Reichman, Of Green Tulips, supra note 132.   See also Jerome H. Reichman & 
Tracy Lewis, Using Liability Rules to Stimulate Local Innovation in Developing Countries:  
Application to Traditional Knowledge, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER 
OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 337-66 
(Keith Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005); Jerome H. Reichman, Saving the Patent 
System from Itself, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 289-304 (F. Scott 
Kieff, ed., 2003). 
202. Liability rules also look particularly attractive in certain pre-competitive 
situations, where efforts are made to pool resources for basic upstream scientific research 
without forfeiting opportunities for financial gain through posterior but unforeseen 
commercial applications.  See, e.g., Rai et al., Pathways Across the Valley of Death, supra note 
44; Jerome H. Reichman, Tom Daederwerdere & Paul F. Uhlir, Designing the Microbial 
Commons, Conference on the Microbial Commons, University of Ghent, 2008; Jerome H. 
REVISED REICHMAN FINAL 3-9-09 3/9/2009  2:26 PM 
2009] RETHINKING THE ROLE OF CLINICAL TRIAL DATA 45 
 
The application of these principles to clinical trial data seems 
particularly compelling, given that we are dealing with regulatory 
outcomes that may become secondary barriers to the marketing of 
pharmaceutical inventions203 that were developed in response to the 
prospects of downstream exclusive rights in the form of patents.  
Typically, these inventions were also a product of upstream government 
funding in the form of university research grants.204  With regard to 
clinical test data, in other words, the issue is not how to stimulate 
further technical innovation at all—it is how to protect the inventor’s 
downstream investment in the enormous costs and risks of conducting 
clinical trials that must meet ever more stringent standards of public 
health and safety. 
If it could be empirically demonstrated that the costs and risks of 
clinical trials—minus the benefits that accrue from a product patent, if 
any, and from the ensuing certification against “lemons”205—failed to 
provide originator pharmaceutical companies with a sufficient return on 
investment, the proper remedy would surely not be to add yet another 
exclusive property right to the mix, with all its attendant social costs for 
both innovation and consumers.  Rather, the logical solution is to 
directly address the risks of diminished investment by allowing generic 
competitors who lawfully enter the market (after any lawful patents 
expire) to share the costs of these same trials for a relatively short 
period of time, without erecting new barriers to entry or otherwise 
delaying the price reductions to patients that competition automatically 
tends to generate. 
At times, the originator company may develop improvements or 
second uses for which no patent becomes available, especially after the 
Supreme Court’s tightened nonobvious standards filter through the 
system.206  Assuming that the product in question delivered real 
 
Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, A Contractually Reconstructed Research Commons for Scientific 
Data in a Highly Protectionist Intellectual Property Environment, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
315 (2003).  For a relevant and revealing economic analysis, see generally Brett M. 
Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management, 89 MINN. L. 
REV. 917 (2005). 
203. See Taubman, supra note 30, at 601. 
204. Marcia Angell, The Truth About the Drug Companies, 45 JURIMETRICS J. 465, 467 
(2005) (“The few innovative drugs usually stem from publicly-funded research done at 
government or university labs.”). 
205. Katz, supra note 161. 
206. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007); Nonobviousness—The 
Shape of Things to Come, supra note 177.  For pre-KSR likelihood, see Junod, supra note 9, 
at 486 (“The impression left . . . is that patents are so easy to obtain that marketing exclusivity 
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therapeutic benefits, the protection of investment in clinical trials might 
afford the only incentive available and the sole remedy for an incipient 
market failure.207  But even in these cases, which appear to have been 
relatively rare in the past,208 there is no reason to reward the investor 
with the very patent-like monopoly he failed to achieve on the merits.  
The most that a market failure due to the risks of a second comer’s 
ability to rely on the innovator’s prior regulatory approval could 
logically justify is a cost-sharing tax on competitors (and consumers) in 
the form of a liability rule along the lines described above.209 
These premises apply with even greater force to the originator 
pharmaceutical companies’ demands for sui generis data exclusivity 
rights in developing countries under the aegis of bilateral and regional 
FTAs that have mushroomed in the post-TRIPS era.210  Given that 
originator pharmaceutical companies will have recouped their 
investments and made their profits by charging high prices in developed 
countries, it is hard to justify any further protection of investments in 
R&D beyond territorial patents in the developing countries.211  Because 
in these countries there is “a large pool of unpatented pharmaceutical 
products,” data exclusivity can “become a partial substitute for patent 
protection.”212  But there is nothing “unfair” in allowing second comers 
to exploit the goodwill accruing to unpatented products.213  If the 
regulatory authorities in developing countries allow generic producers 
to rely on bioequivalence with products approved elsewhere (a reliance 
rooted in both foreign regulatory outcomes and the relevant scientific 
 
is not necessary. . . .  [A] firm can get not one, but several, twenty-year patents for all aspects 
of its drug, without—at least in practice—being unduly encumbered by the nonobviousness 
requirement.”). 
207. Unless the government covered the costs of clinical trials in the first place, in 
which case the unpatentable improvement should compete profitably on the open market if it 
actually delivered therapeutic benefits.  See infra Part II.B.2.a. 
208. See Junod, supra note 9, at 485-86. 
209. As previously noted, FIFRA already employs such a regime for pesticides, and 
USTR initially proposed such a regime for article 39.3 of TRIPS.  See, e.g., Fellmeth, supra 
note 130, at 479-83. 
210. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
211. But see Fellmeth, supra note 130, at 496 (rejecting data exclusivity as a de facto 
attempt “to subsidize wealthy foreign drug developers” but accepting the view that generic 
manufacturers in developing countries should “pay their fair share of the costs of using trade 
secrets in their country”). 
212. Correa, Unfair Competition Under the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 46, at 70. 
213. See Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938); Sears, Roebuck & 
Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964) (Sears-Compco Doctrine); Wal-Mart Stores v. Samara 
Bros., 529 U.S. 205 (2000). 
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literature), it is hard to see why they should be charged anything at all 
for the alleged “use” in their countries of so-called trade secrets that 
they have never actually seen at all.214 
Nevertheless, to the extent that, rightly or wrongly, some protection 
of clinical test data has become a nonnegotiable cost of doing business 
under FTAs with the United States, developing country governments 
should stand firm on counter proposals offering only a cost-sharing 
liability rule and not an exclusive property right.215  To this end, 
Professor Aaron Fellmeth has lately published a still more refined 
“Readjustable Royalties Model,” which factors the developing 
countries’ ability to pay into the calculus of reasonable royalties.216 
Unfortunately, developing-country trade negotiators have not 
generally adopted this cost-sharing approach, perhaps in the mistaken 
belief that they could resist USTR’s pressures for data exclusivity on 
other grounds.  As a result, the intellectual property chapters in most 
FTAs that have so far been concluded embody variations on the 
exclusive property regimes previously described.217  It remains to be seen 
whether Asian countries, such as Korea and India, which offer strong 
market-access incentives of their own, will turn the tide by successfully 
defending a liability rule in lieu of an exclusive property right.218 
Even that auspicious outcome, however, would not necessarily 
provide an adequate solution to the questions posed at the outset of this 
enquiry.  To be sure, a liability rule would address any claims sounding 
in the incentive and fairness rationales—whatever their validity might 
be219—without generating the subsidies, barriers to entry, and other 
social costs attendant upon a data exclusivity regime.  But such an 
approach, still begs the second question posed earlier, namely, why 
should the private sector be obliged to provide and pay for clinical test 
data in the first place?  It is to this fundamental question that we must 
turn now, in the concluding section of Part II. 
 
214. See, e.g., Timmermans, supra note 11, at 206 (arguing that “while . . . generic 
manufacturers indirectly rely on the originator’s safety and efficacy data,” they “do not use 
the originator’s data—in fact they do not even have access to them”); Bayer, Inc. v. Canada,1 
F.C. 553, T-1154-97.  But see Fellmeth, supra note 130, at 496. 
215. See supra text accompanying notes 140-54 (discussing proposals by Reichman, 
Weissman, Love, and others).   
216. Fellmeth, supra note 130, at 482-96. 
217. See supra text accompanying notes 108-20. 
218. Maskus & Reichman, The Globalization of Private Knowledge Goods, supra note 
97, at 14.   
219. See, e.g., Taubman, supra note 30. 
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B. From Private to Public Goods: The Most Logical Reform 
At the outset, this Article evidenced the soaring costs of clinical 
trials in the United States, which a well-known study estimated as high 
as one billion dollars per approved new chemical entity (when adjusted 
for the four out of five failure rate currently reported).220  Since then, the 
questions on the table have been whether, in order to recoup these 
costs, the originator pharmaceutical companies should be entitled to a 
second revenue stream from a sui generis data exclusivity right, in 
addition to patents, and if so, the extent to which international 
intellectual property law should recognize a similar right under either 
the TRIPS Agreement or the proliferating FTAs that have succeeded it.  
Now, instead, it is time to step back and ask what might be 
fundamentally wrong with this entire picture. 
American consumers already pay the highest prices in the world for 
patented pharmaceuticals largely because they are routinely told they 
must cover the soaring costs of pharmaceutical research and 
development.221  Because the NIH and the Department of Energy alone 
spend more than thirty billion dollars a year to defray the costs of basic 
research in nonprofit institutions,222 it follows that the bulk of the costs 
chargeable to American consumers must pertain to clinical trials 
conducted to meet public health and safety regulations.223  Why, then, 
are the results of these trials increasingly untrustworthy, distorted, or 
outright fraudulent?224  And why, if American consumers must cover the 
high costs of clinical trials, are much poorer consumers in developing 
countries increasingly denied affordable medicines—including off-
patent generics—on the grounds that, they, too, must help defray the 
burgeoning costs of the same increasingly unreliable clinical trials?225 
My thesis is that the drive to protect clinical trial data internationally 
is but the latest and most far-reaching consequence of the deep 
structural problems that flow from the failure to treat clinical trials as a 
national and international public good.226  So long as this market-
 
220. DiMasi et al., supra note 5. 
221. See, e.g., Angell, supra note 204. 
222. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
223. See, e.g., Grabowski, Increasing R&D Incentives, supra note 19; Grabowski, Data 
Exclusivity, supra note 54.   
224. See, e.g., Daniel R. Cahoy, Medical Product Information Incentives and the 
Transparency Paradox, 82 IND. L.J. 623 (2007); Angell, supra note 204, at 466-67; supra notes 
1-3 and accompanying text. 
225. See, e.g., Correa, Bilateralism in Intellectual Property, supra note 117, at 83. 
226. See Lewis et al., The Case for Public Funding, supra note 32. 
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distorting anomaly persists, clinical data as a guarantor of public safety 
will remain undersupplied, the scientific benefits of such trials will be 
impeded, and the drive to keep secret the very data that logically 
require the highest degree of transparency will produce rippling 
legislative distortions and high social costs that now take the form of 
pseudo-intellectual property rights. 
In what follows, I describe a proposal to treat clinical trials as a 
public good that was jointly developed by Professors Tracy Lewis, 
Anthony So, and myself.227  Our approach would provide a longer-term 
solution to a deep structural problem in national and international drug 
supply chains by rationalizing the treatment of clinical trials from a 
political economic perspective.  It would also eliminate both the risk of 
free-riding on private sector R&D and the need for secrecy or de facto 
intellectual property protection of the resulting data. 
1. Public Disclosure: Only the First Step in a Broader Reform 
Recent revelations about the suppression of adverse findings in the 
clinical testing of new medicines pending FDA approval have led many 
to call for mandatory disclosure of all clinical trial results.228  As 
previously noted, Professor Eisenberg would craft the data exclusivity 
right so as to provide pharmaceutical companies additional incentives to 
conduct better quality trials in exchange for public disclosure of the 
results.229  These proposals move in the right direction towards 
 
227. Part II.B of this article is largely based on two versions of an earlier article, one 
published and another unpublished longer version.  For the short, published version, see 
Lewis et. al., The Case for Public Funding, supra note 32.  The longer version, with revisions 
and updates, is substantially reproduced here for the first time.  See also Dean Baker, The 
Benefits and Savings from Publicly-Funded Clinical Trials of Prescription Drugs, Center for 
Economic and Policy Research (March 2008), available at http://www.cepr.net (a “paper . . . in 
large part inspired by . . . [the] plan” set out in Lewis, Reichman, & So, The Case for Public 
Funding, (2007)). 
228. See, e.g., Pierre Azoulay, The Changing Economics of Clinical Development, 
Paper Presented at the Program on Science, Technology, and Global Science, The Earth Inst. 
at Columbia Univ. (May 20, 2004); Press Release, AMA, AMA recommends that DHHS 
establish a registry for all US clinical trials (June 15, 2004), http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/article/1616-8651.html; Press Release, American Academy of Child and 
Adolescent Psychiatry & American Psychiatric Association, Leading Medical Groups 
Endorse Public Clinical Trials Registry (Sept. 9, 2004), 
http://www.aacap.org/press_releases/2004/0909.htm. See also Senators Introduce Legislation 
That Would Establish Clinical Trial Registry Database, MEDILEXICON, Oct. 9, 2004, 
http://www.pharma-lexicon.com/medicalnews.php?newsid=14711; Medical journals to require 
clinical trial registration, NEW SCIENTIST, Sept. 9, 2004, available at 
http://www.newscientist.com /news/print.jsp?id=ns99996378. 
229. Eisenberg, supra note 49, at 366-72. 
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addressing the selective disclosure of pharmaceutical testing results, 
study design biases, and other questionable practices.230  However, 
disclosure is not the main problem but rather a symptom of a much 
deeper structural problem.   
Mandatory disclosure without addressing this deeper problem yields 
a less than optimal approach to rationalizing the regulatory machinery 
governing the supply of pharmaceutical products.  Requiring mandatory 
disclosure of clinical trials will not eliminate the inherent conflict of 
interest underlying the commercial provision of drugs and medicine or 
the fundamental inefficiencies the current system promotes.  So long as 
drug companies retain primary responsibility for conducting or funding 
clinical trials, they will be tempted to selectively disclose information 
and to avoid research programs that could reveal unfavorable outcomes.  
Nor would a disclosure requirement alone ensure that the stakeholding 
company will conduct all the tests deemed most beneficial to public 
safety.231 
For example, until the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute 
funded the Women’s Health Initiative, the risks and benefits of 
postmenopausal hormone therapy remained inadequately assessed by 
randomized clinical trial procedures despite its widespread use.232  
Equally troubling, drug company sponsors completed Phase IV clinical 
trials necessary for upgrading to regular approval in only six of twenty-
three fast-track approvals of cancer drugs.233  There are few incentives to 
undertake costly testing if the results might only serve to narrow use of 
the drug to a smaller subgroup of patients or prove unfavorable to its 
continued use. 
A better alternative to calls for mandatory disclosure is to remove 
 
230. See, e.g., Harris, Gardner. Spitzer Sues a Drug Maker, Saying It Hid Negative 
Data, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2004, at A1; Peter Juni et al., Risk of cardiovascular events and 
rotecoxib: Cumulative meta-analysis, THE LANCET, Nov. 5, 2004, 
http://image.theLancet.com/extras/04art10237web.pdf.  See also Dong BJ, Gambertoglio JG, 
Gee L et al., Bioequivalence of Levothyroxine Preparations:  Industry Sponsorship and 
Academic Freedom, 277(15) JAMA 1200-01 (1997). 
231. Lewis et al., The Case for Public Funding, supra note 32.  See also Baker, supra 
note 227, at 3 (citing Turner et al., 2008; Bodenheimer, 2000; Cho & Bero, 1996; among 
others). 
232. See, e.g., Writing Group for the Women’s Health Initiative Investigators, Risks 
and Benefits of Estrogen Plus Progestin in Healthy Postmenopausal Women:  Principal Results 
From the Women’s Health Initiative Randomized Controlled Trial, 288 JAMA 321-33 (2002); 
Lawrence M. Brass, Hormone Replacement Therapy and Stroke: Clinical Trials Review, 2004 
STROKE 35. 
233. Thomas G. Roberts, Jr. & Bruce A. Chabner, Beyond Fast Track for Drug 
Approvals, 351(5) NEW ENG. J. MED. 501 (2004). 
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the direct link between the test sponsor (the drug company) and the 
drug testers.  One approach would be to establish an independent 
testing agency to conduct clinical trials under specified conditions of 
transparency.  Unlike the current system, drug companies would no 
longer directly compensate the scientists evaluating their own products.  
Instead, the scientists would now work for the testing agency, supported 
by general funds collected from the pharmaceutical industry.234  This 
separation of clinical trials from sponsorship could attenuate the conflict 
of interest problem, and it would better ensure objective processing with 
full disclosure of results under the aegis of a national testing facility than 
the current system.235 
Even if the competitive logistics of such an approach posed no 
unsolvable problems, however, it would insufficiently rationalize the 
drug supply and pricing process, and thus fail to realize the potential 
benefits of treating clinical trials as a public good.236  To this end, the 
federal government, rather than the drug companies, should fund the 
bulk of the costs of clinical trials.  This thesis follows from a careful 
examination of both the economics of drug supply as well as the political 
economy of prescription drug programs at home and abroad, as 
explained below. 
2. The Case for Treating Clinical Trials as a Public Good 
At the outset, it seems clear that the information gleaned from the 
clinical testing of drugs and therapies is a public good in the sense that 
each individual citizen benefits from such information without reducing 
its value to others.237  At the same time, the results of the testing process 
reveal information that improves the conduct of R&D in the industry as 
a whole without disturbing the validity of underlying patents that 
 
234. Lewis et al., The Case for Public Funding, supra note 32, at 1.   
235. Cf., e.g., Uwe E. Reinhardt, Perspectives on the Pharmaceutical Industry, 20(5) 
HEALTH AFF. 136, 145-47 (2001) (suggesting creation of financially independent pharmaco-
economic research institutes to assess costs and benefits of new and existing drugs). 
236. Cf., e.g., Uwe E. Reinhardt, An Information Infrastructure for the Pharmaceutical 
Market, 23(2) HEALTH AFF. 107, 109 (2004) (stressing importance of treating information 
about pharmaceutical effectiveness as a public good).  In his 2004 article, Professor Reinhardt 
proposed the creation of a publicly funded research organization to evaluate the cost 
effectiveness of drugs and to disseminate the results.  Id.  Lewis, Reichman, and So believe 
the public good rationale he expounds should be expanded to cover the production and 
dissemination of clinical trial data as such.  Lewis et al., The Case for Public Funding, supra 
note 32. 
237. See, e.g., Reinhardt, supra note 236, at 109 (stressing non-excludable and non-
rivalrous character of “information that facilitates the proper functioning of a healthcare 
market—such as that for drugs”).  See also Taubman, supra note 30. 
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protect the products and processes of innovative firms.238 
Like peer-reviewed basic research results, which have always been 
recognized as a public good, peer-reviewed clinical trial results should 
promote surer decisions about the safety and therapeutic value of both 
single products and product groups while stimulating follow-on 
innovation and providing guidance for better clinical practice.  Yet, 
despite these potential public benefits, our current system saddles 
private companies with the burdens of clinical testing and thus renders 
the results artificially scarce and excludable.  This approach ignores 
economic principles teaching that privately supplied public goods will 
typically be underprovided.239  In this context, undersupply evokes cases 
in which a head-to-head comparison between therapeutically equivalent 
drugs was not studied; an adverse drug reaction was not explored; a 
specified clinical indication was not appropriately narrowed; or the 
possibility of use for a neglected disease was not pursued.240 
Those concerned that current clinical testing practices fail to meet 
public health needs may nonetheless question a proposal for public 
support of drug testing.  The response is that the practice of shunting the 
provision of such a crucial public good as clinical trials to the private 
pharmaceutical sector has become unsustainable over time.241  Rather 
than continue this market distortion, the most rational reform is to shift 
some portion of the cost of clinically testing new pharmaceutical 
products to the public sector, with a view towards rationalizing the 
supply chain for medicines and to lowering the prices of drugs to 
consumers to levels more reasonably related to their actual R&D costs. 
a. The Drug Companies’ Costs Would Decline with Government 
Funding of Clinical Trials 
The total direct cost of drug testing should fall with public funding, 
oversight, and full disclosure of clinical trial results, especially of 
unfavorable or negative results.  Such a program would enable 
investigators to exploit economies of scale and scope in testing, would 
minimize unnecessary redundancies, and would allow researchers to 
interpret and compare the results of different tests.  Public disclosure of 
trial results should further reduce research and development costs as 
 
238. Lewis et al., The Case for Public Funding, supra note 32, at 1-2. 
239. See, e.g., Reinhardt, supra note 236, at 109 (stating that “the private sector 
typically does not produce these [public information] goods in socially efficient quantities”). 
240. On the orphan drugs question, see Grabowski, Increasing R&D Incentives, supra 
note 19, at 459-60. 
241. See supra notes 33-44 and accompanying text. 
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drug companies learn earlier which candidate medicines are 
therapeutically effective and which are not.242   
Admittedly, some of the benefits from centralized clinical testing 
could be achieved without public sponsorship.  One could require drug 
companies to pay for publicly supervised tests, and some cost savings 
would still presumably occur.  However, public support of drug testing 
would provide additional dividends far exceeding the direct cost savings 
from a privately funded program of clinical testing, as shown below.   
b. Lower Drug Company Costs Would Benefit Consumers in the Short 
Run 
Drug companies’ costs of developing and marketing new medicines 
should fall significantly with public funding of clinical trials and full 
disclosure of the results.  Recent studies show the growing importance 
of these costs in determining the aggregate expense of bringing new 
drugs to market,243 in a lottery-like environment where “most drug 
candidates taken into testing fail.”244 
A reduction in the costs of supply and in the attendant risks of 
investing in failed drugs would enable companies to reduce the prices of 
successful new drugs while still earning a competitive return on 
investment.245  Public funding of clinical tests would also provide more 
transparent estimates of the total costs of drug supply, which would 
allow health insurers to more accurately assess what revenues were 
 
242. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 227. 
243. See. e.g., Grabowski, Increasing R&D Incentives, supra note 19, at 460 (stressing 
increase of R&D costs at an annual rate of 7.4% above inflation compared to 1980s and 
finding size and number of clinical trials “[a] major factor accounting for this growth in 
costs”); DiMasi et al., supra note 5.  These authors found: 
We may approximate the increases in cost per subject over time by examining the 
excess of medical care inflation over general price inflation. The medical care 
component of the CPI increased at an average annual rate of 6.73% from 1984 to 
1997, while general price inflation (applying the price index used to deflate costs for 
this study) rose at an annual rate of 3.06% over the same period. Thus, other things 
being equal, these results suggest an increase of 11.4% per year in clinical trial costs. 
This compares to our finding of an 11.8% annual growth rate in out-of-pocket 
clinical period cost between DiMasi et al. (1991) and the current study. 
Id. at 177.  See also Patricia M. Danzon & Adrian Towse, Theory and Implementation of 
Differential Pricing for Pharmaceuticals, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND 
TRANSFER UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 428 (Keith E. 
Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005) (R&D costs account for roughly 30% of total cost 
of new drugs). 
244. See. e.g., Grabowski, Increasing R&D Incentives, supra note 19, at 460-61 (adding 
that, of those that survive, only a few “succeed in generating very large returns”). 
245. Lewis et al., The Case for Public Funding, supra note 32, at 3. 
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required for continued pharmaceutical innovation.  Unlike programs for 
capping drug prices that require a full accounting of all drug company 
costs,246 this proposal would generate pressures on drug companies to 
reduce prices only in proportion to the observed cost savings generated 
by public funding and disclosure of clinical test results.247  These savings 
would affect the costliest component of the entire downstream R&D 
budget, and they would further reduce investment risks by building 
upon the federal government’s already substantial funding of basic 
research. 
While health providers would benefit from the lower costs of 
procuring prescription drugs, consumers are the primary beneficiaries of 
this program.  Many consumers cannot afford the monopoly prices 
charged by patent protected drug manufacturers.  A reduction in prices 
due to lowered costs of clinical testing would allow low income and 
uninsured patients greater access to medicines.248  The well known 
allocative distortions that arise from patent protected medicines would 
be reduced to the extent that public support of clinical testing forced 
drug prices to decline.   
c. Long Run Efficiencies in Drug Discovery and Development 
Analysts note with alarm that the overall rate of innovation for new 
medicines and therapies appears to be slowing, while the gap between 
R&D investment and output has widened.249  Moreover, existing 
projects do not routinely address socially important therapeutic needs, 
as when firms decrease or abandon R&D opportunities pertaining to 
antibacterial drugs despite evidence of mounting resistance to available 
 
246. The difficulty of reliably establishing these costs is well established in the 
literature.  See. e.g., Baker, supra note 227. 
247. For detailed mechanisms to reduce prices in relation to government funding of 
clinical trials, see id. 
248. Id. at 8-14.  Under Baker’s figures, 
the potential savings from the Medicare prescription drug program are large enough 
by themselves to easily cover the expense of publicly financed clinical trials.  
However, there could also be savings for state and local governments if the federal 
government designed a system in which it also negotiated lower prices on the behalf 
of other units of government. 
Id. at 13. 
249. See, e.g., Rai et al., Pathways Across the Valley of Death, supra note 44 (citing 
Treating the poor health of the industry, IMS HEALTH, Sept. 29, 2004, 
http://open.imshealth.com/IMSinclude/i_article_ 20040929.asp; Changing Patterns of 
Pharmaceutical Innovation, NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR HEALTH CARE MANAGEMENT 
RESEARCH AND EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION, May 2002, http://www.nihcm.org 
/innovations.pdf). 
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antibiotics.250  Although there are multiple contributing factors to this 
apparent slow down in pharmaceutical innovation,251 rationalizing the 
clinical trial component of the drug supply chain would arguably 
stimulate more productive R&D and more affordable end products. 
(1) Stimulating More Investment in Innovative R&D with Lower Costs 
and Better Information 
Besides reducing the costs of clinical testing and greatly lessening 
the private sector’s risks of developing drugs for clinical use, the 
heightened transparency resulting from a public-good approach should–
as previously observed–enable private and public health care providers 
to press companies to reduce their prices.252  A fall in prescription drug 
prices would reduce the variable profit the company earned on existing 
drug sales.  As the unit profit from each additional sale declined, the 
marginal incentives to market medications to increase sales might also 
decrease, which could help to discourage wasteful expenditures on 
marketing and promotion.253   
More importantly, if drug companies no longer had to defray the 
 
250. Steven J. Projan, Why is big Pharma getting out of antibacterial drug discovery?, 6 
CURRENT OPINION IN MICROBIOLOGY 427-30 (2003); Per Nordberg, Dominique L. Monnet 
& Otto Cars, Antibacterial Drug Resistance:  Options for Concerted Action, in PRIORITY 
MEDICINES FOR EUROPE AND THE WORLD PROJECT: A PUBLIC HEALTH APPROACH TO 
INNOVATION (World Health Organization, Feb. 2005), available at 
http://mednet3.who.int/prioritymeds/report/index.htm. 
251. See, e.g., Iain Cockburn, The Changing Structure of the Pharmaceutical Industry, 
23 HEALTH AFF. 10 (Jan./Feb. 2004) (stressing unreplenished pipeline and other causal 
factors for past slow down); Rai et al., Pathways Across the Valley of Death, supra note 44 
(discussing need to pool small molecule libraries for upstream basic research by university 
scientists using high-throughput screening technology). 
252. See supra notes 247-48 and accompanying text. 
253. Lewis et al., The Case for Public Funding, supra note 32.  For evidence, see, e.g., 
Jun Ma, Randall S. Stafford, Iain M. Cockburn & Stan N. Finkelstein, A statistical analysis of 
the magnitude and composition of drug promotion in the United States in 1998, 25 CLINICAL 
THERAPEUTICS 1503-17 (2003). 
The researchers analyzed nationally representative data on expenditures for the 250 
most promoted medications in the United States in 1998 and the five most 
commonly used modes of promotion.  During that year, the pharmaceutical industry 
spent $12,724 million promoting its products in the United States, of which 86 
percent was accounted for by the top 250 drugs and 52 percent by the top 50 drugs.  
Direct-to-consumer advertising was more concentrated on a small subset of 
medications than was promotion directed to professionals. 
Id.  Direct consumer advertising alone reportedly cost the pharmaceutical companies $2.6 
billion in 2003. See Jennifer Harper, Drug ads provide a mixed blessing; But consumers do go 
to doctor, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2004, at A08.  Growth in promotion reportedly outstripped 
growth in research spending by more than 50 percent.  See David Pauly, Drug Companies’ 
Cost of Pushing Pills Rivals R&D, BLOOMBERG, Aug. 26, 2004. 
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cumulative costs of clinical trials, the threshold level of profitability for 
new candidate drugs—estimated by some to range between 800 million 
to one billion dollars—would likely fall by a considerable amount.254  
This lower threshold could significantly reduce profit requirements that 
discourage the introduction and development of new drugs. 
The resources drug companies now expend to market and protect 
existing drugs from competition could be redeployed to discover new 
and potentially more valuable medicines if the state bore some 
significant portion of the cost of clinical trials.  Given lower testing costs 
and lowered risk premiums, firms could expect profits from a much 
broader range of products taken to market than at present, and 
incentives to discover such products would correspondingly increase in a 
less lottery-like environment.255   
Moreover, with public disclosure of previous clinical trial results 
concerning related medicines, companies could better predict which 
candidate medications should be effective and safe for clinical use.  For 
example, early disclosure of clinical trial findings that Vioxx posed 
greater risks than originally known might have prompted its worldwide 
market withdrawal, increased scrutiny of similar drugs, and accelerated 
R&D to find a better product in the same therapeutic class.256  More 
private funding for drug research and development might follow as drug 
companies improved at predicting clinical success earlier in the drug 
approval process.   
To this end, a competitive framework for peer-reviewed, federal 
grant support of clinical trials could be designed to reward those lines of 
investigation that promised major pharmaceutical innovation or that 
answered important questions about clinical cost-effectiveness.  Where 
therapeutic competition is lacking, public funding might lower the 
barrier to new entrants without undermining patent rights.  In so doing, 
this public investment in clinical trials might amplify the benefits of 
lower drug prices through enhanced therapeutic competition that could 
impact existing, not just new, drugs on the market.257 
 
254. Accord, Baker, supra note 227, at 14. 
255. Lewis et al., The Case for Public Funding, supra note 32, at 4.  See also Grabowski, 
Increasing R&D Incentives, supra note 19, at 460-61 (stressing lottery like atmosphere where 
most products fail to recoup R&D costs). 
256. Matthew Herper, Pfizer’s Vioxx Problem, FORBES, Oct. 15, 2004,   
http://www.forbes.com/2004/10/15/cx_mh_1015bextra_print.html.   
257. Lewis et al., The Case for Public Funding, supra note 32, at 4. 
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(2) A Secondary Market for Remedial Improvers 
Public funding and disclosure of clinical trial results could also 
stimulate a secondary collaborative market for finding remedies to 
investigational obstacles that thwarted development of promising 
medications.  Various reasons account for drug company decisions to 
shelve products pending approval rather than completing the costly 
clinical testing process.  Sometimes it is a marketing decision, while at 
other times, it is a clinical setback that mandates a new investigational 
course.  A registry of the drugs failing clinical standards and of the data 
yielded by the tests could be made available for improvements by third 
parties after a suitable period of time.258   
A company whose drug application had been denied or withdrawn 
would have a specified period to seek remedies to the deficiencies 
identified at trial, in order to qualify for a new round of testing.  If the 
originating company failed to meet this requirement, the relevant data 
could be relegated to a legally defined semicommons open to would-be 
third party improvers.  If any of the latter solved the problem and 
restored the candidate drug’s chances of FDA approval, that successful 
improver could gain the right to market the drug in return for payment 
of a reasonable royalty to the originator company in case of commercial 
success to cover earlier costs of R&D.259  A version of this approach 
already exists for agricultural chemical test data in the United States.  
After a period of exclusivity, follow-on competitors may enter the 
marketplace by providing compensation to the originating company that 
invested in the line of research to help cover the costs of obtaining 
public safety data.260 
 
258. See supra note 230; Marc J. Scheineson & M. Lynn Sykes, Major New Initiatives 
Require Increased Disclosure of Clinical Trial Information,  60 FOOD DRUG L.J. 525,535-540 
(2005).  But see the discussion of risks in Daniel R. Cahoy, Medical Product Information 
Incentives and the Transparency Paradox, 82 IND. L.J. 623 (2007). 
259. See Reichman, Of Green Tulips, supra note 132.  See also Rai et al., Pathways 
Across the Valley of Death, supra note 44; Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 202, at 315-440.  If 
the original failed product were patented, the improver under such a “compensatory liability 
regime” would in effect obtain a tailor-made dependent compulsory license (“antiblocking” 
license) like those generally available for improvement patents in most developed countries 
(but not the United States).  On this premise, the originator company might also receive a 
cross-license on the patented improvement. Cf. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, art. 31(l) 
(compulsory licenses for dependent patents). 
 260. See FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y, at §§136a(c)(2)(B).  See also Weissman, 
NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 130, at 157; Fellmeth, supra note 130. 
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3. Implementing a Public Testing Program   
The government should fund clinical tests to the fullest extent 
permitted by sound fiscal policy.  The definition of products subject to 
this proposal should be broad enough to include drug treatments, 
vaccines, medical devices, and diagnostic or monitoring tests.  The term 
“clinical trials” means Phases I through III as understood in current 
FDA practice, as well as post-approval Phase IV clinical trials.261 
a. Awarding Clinical Tests to the Most Qualified Scientists 
Nothing in this proposal requires the government to physically 
conduct the tests under the aegis of a specialized agency, although this 
remains a possibility.  One may anticipate that an industry comprised of 
the qualified and experienced scientists who have previously conducted 
clinical tests for the drug companies would emerge initially to perform 
clinical testing under this program.  The primary role of the government 
would be to oversee competitive awards of testing contracts to worthy 
testing organizations—either public or private, but not affiliated with 
the drug companies—in accordance with public health priorities. 
This approach builds on proven strengths of the federal government 
to administer extramural research grants, like those that the NIH 
routinely award.  As already occurs in that grant-making process, 
scientific review panels would identify potential biases in study design, 
and, with inputs from the drug regulatory authority, insist on 
appropriate treatment comparisons by the designated clinical trial 
units.262 
b. Revenue Neutral Financing with Cost Sharing and Social Funding 
Criteria 
Government funding of clinical tests should be revenue-neutral in 
 
261. Each phase of the clinical trial process is designed to answer distinct research 
questions.  In Phase I, researchers testing a new drug or treatment in small groups for the first 
time seek to evaluate overall safety, determine a safe dose range, and identify side effects.  
During Phase II, use by a larger group of subjects focuses on effectiveness, further 
evaluations of safety, and finding the right dose.  Phase III tests on large groups of people 
seek to confirm estimates of effectiveness, monitor side effects, compare the new product to 
commonly used treatments, and to collect more information bearing on safe usage.  Phase IV 
studies are conducted after marketing of the drug or treatment in question to gather 
information about its effects on different populations and any side effects associated with 
long-term use. See the NIH resource information on clinical trials at 
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/services/ctphases.html. 
262. Lewis et al., The Case for Public Funding, supra note 32, at 3. 
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principle.263  Public support of clinical testing could be financed directly 
by the reduced drug reimbursements the federal government should pay 
as the country’s largest employer and provider of health insurance.264  If 
market forces and health insurers’ pressures failed to secure the desired 
level of social returns, in the form of lowered drug prices, from the 
proposed public investment, additional safeguards could become 
necessary.  Some combination of moral suasion, compulsory licensing, 
or other legal measures to address patent misuse and the larger public 
interest might then be invoked for this purpose.265  Yet, heightened 
transparency could make it costly for the drug industry to frustrate the 
goals of government funded clinical trials and thus render such 
safeguard measures unnecessary in practice.  Moreover, even these 
measures – if required in extreme cases - appear relatively unobtrusive 
against the backdrop of growing demands for the price regulation 
schemes practiced abroad266 and for mounting calls for government 
control of the innovation process.267 
 
263. Id. at 4. 
264. For details, see Baker, supra note 227. 
265. Jerome H. Reichman, Comment: A Trilogy of Views about Compulsory Licensing 
of Patented Pharmaceutical Inventions, SYMPOSIUM ISSUE, 37 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 
(forthcoming 2009);  JEROME H. REICHMAN WITH CATHERINE HASENZAHL, NON-
VOLUNTARY LICENSING OF PATENTED INVENTIONS:  LEGAL FRAMEWORK UNDER TRIPS, 
AND AN OVERVIEW OF THE PRACTICE IN CANADA AND THE USA, ICTSD/UNCTAD Issue 
Paper No. 5, Intellectual Property Rights and Sustainable Development Series 
(ICTSD/UNCTAD 2002), available at http://ictsd.net/i/publications/11764/  (last visited Jan. 
19, 2009). 
266. Some observers argue that safeguards embodied in the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 
already provide the basis for federally authorized price controls of pharmaceuticals based on 
federally funded research results.  See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 202(a)(i)-(iii) (2002) (power of NIH to 
restrict patenting of federally funded research results in “exceptional circumstances”); 35 
U.S.C. § 203(1)(a), (b) (march-in rights under Bayh-Dole Act of 1980); Peter S. Arno & 
Michael H. Davis, Why Don’t We Enforce Existing Drug Price Controls?, 75 TUL. L. REV. 631 
(2001).  For the view that the Bayh-Dole Act provisions provide a potentially workable 
framework for regulating misuse of patents on federally funded research results,  see Jerome 
H. Reichman, Testimony Before NIH Public Hearing on March-In Rights Under the Bayh-
Dole Act (May 23, 2004).    However, others believe that, in their present form, these same 
provisions are unworkable without serious administrative reforms.  See Arti K. Rai & 
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 289 (2003).  See generally, Anthony So et al., Is Bayh-Dole Good for 
Developing Countries? Lessons from the US Experience, 6 PLOS BIOLOGY 2078 (Oct. 2008), 
available at www.plosbiology.org. 
267. See, e.g., Hubbard & Love, supra note 92; Eduardo Porter, Do New Drugs Always 
Have to Cost So Much?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2004, at BU5; Dean Baker, Financing Drug 
Research:  What Are the Issues?, CENTER FOR ECON. & POL’Y RES., Sept. 22, 2004, 
http://www.cepr.net/publications/patents_what_are_the_issues_9-20.pdf (reviewing four 
reform proposals). 
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It must be stressed that the drug companies should bear some share 
of the costs of conducting clinical trials, irrespective of the government’s 
ultimate fiscal capacity.  This safeguard is needed to discourage the 
wholesale testing of marginal drugs with little therapeutic value or of 
candidate medicines with little chance of clinical adoption.  A process 
that reimbursed a progressively larger share of testing costs for those 
medicines that displayed the greatest potential benefits would 
encourage companies to select only the most promising medicines for 
clinical review at public expense.  Moreover, the bulk of any 
reimbursements for Phase I and II trials could be delayed until, and 
conditioned on, the success of Phase III trials, with varying 
reimbursement formulas depending on the potential public benefits in 
case of success. 
Any pharmaceutical company that failed to win a sizeable amount of 
government funding for any given product could, of course, proceed to 
conduct the relevant trials at its own expenses, as at present.  Selective 
funding of clinical trials would thus afford the government some 
discretion in supporting the development of drugs with greatest 
potential social value that might otherwise be overlooked under a 
totally market-driven approach.268  An important factor in any such 
selection process would be the overall public health impact of the 
candidate drug.  This factor would be measured by the relative burden 
of the underlying disease, by the availability of existing clinical options 
to treat it, by the need to stimulate greater competition within a given 
therapeutic class, and by the need to treat certain neglected diseases, 
including both rare or orphan diseases, by means that might otherwise 
not be developed absent government assistance. 
c. Phased Implementation 
Transforming clinical trials from an excluded private good to a non-
excluded public good is an ambitious undertaking, one that would 
require gradual implementation.  The first step would be to decouple 
drug company sponsorship from the management of clinical trials, by 
requiring the federal government to oversee the trials and dissemination 
of results under the aegis of a national testing program. 
Second, the program would conduct pilot projects targeting drug 
candidates that promised the greatest social benefit from public testing.  
Drugs that offered innovative therapeutic benefits, or significant gains 
over existing treatments, would receive a preferred status.  As the 
 
268. Lewis et al., The Case for Public Funding, supra note 32, at 3. 
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program grew, public testing would expand to drugs that offered 
therapeutic alternatives in treatment areas where there were none. 
Finally, after a set period, the pilot projects would be evaluated to 
identify the costs and benefits of public testing and dissemination for 
chosen drug groups, and to indicate other drug groups the program 
might include.269  Over time, however, the more fully that the federal 
government was able to absorb the aggregate costs of the clinical testing 
process, the greater would be the benefits along the drug supply chain as 
a whole. 
d. Globalization of the Public Good Concept 
By focusing attention on the public good nature of clinical trial data, 
the foregoing discussion necessarily locates the drive for data exclusivity 
within the larger context of clarifying the role of global public goods in 
an integrated world market for freely traded private goods and services.  
Here, we encounter mounting tensions between measures to stimulate 
an “incipient transnational system of innovation” through trade-related 
intellectual property rights and long-established governmental 
obligations to provide such public goods as health, education, food 
security, scientific research, environmental safety, and a well-
functioning competitive economy.270 
Increasingly, these tensions arise because privatized knowledge 
goods protected by international intellectual property rights function as 
inputs into domestic public goods, which inputs, if unregulated, may 
lead to high prices in poor countries and rising levels of deadweight 
loss.271  While adversely affected developing countries struggle to resolve 
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these tensions by resorting to the so-called “flexibilities” within the 
TRIPS Agreement itself,272 developed countries that count on rents from 
knowledge goods qua tradable assets press them to forego these 
flexibilities in the name of “respecting IPRs.”273  Gradually, the 
technology exporting countries have whittled down these flexibilities 
through TRIPS-plus provisions in bilateral and regional Free Trade 
Agreements.274 
The drive to augment the protection of privately generated clinical 
trial data at the international level fits logically within this conceptual 
framework and exemplifies the relative indifference to distributional 
effects that often accompanies efforts to elevate international 
intellectual property standards without seating those who represent the 
public interest at the table.275  With specific regard to clinical trial data, 
however, these tensions between private and public goods seem easier 
to resolve than in many other cases.   
As a relative newcomer to the international stage, the status of data 
exclusivity in intellectual property law remains unsettled and relatively 
unstable, as witnessed by its collocation under the rubric of unfair 
competition law within Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement itself.276  If 
the treatment of clinical trial data as a private good in developed 
countries represents a fundamentally flawed concept, a resolute reform 
that recognized such data as a public good in the developed world could 
itself constitute a platform for rapid recognition of this same subject 
matter as a global public good.277 
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Once policymakers began to view clinical trials from that angle, 
rather than as a private-sector obligation whose results and outcomes 
must be rendered artificially scarce,278 they could find dazzling 
opportunities to restructure the conduct and delivery of clinical trials on 
an efficient worldwide basis.  For example, transnational testing 
agencies, perhaps governed by the World Health Organization 
(“WHO”), could achieve additional economies of scale and scope, 
which would drive the costs progressively lower for all participating 
countries.  Transparency with regard to outcomes would then serve to 
advance medical research everywhere and could stimulate targeted 
development aid for public-private partnerships seeking to make 
essential drugs more affordable.279  State subsidies of clinical trials, and 
the resulting reductions in the price of drugs that would ensue, could 
take some of the pressure off growing tendencies to invoke compulsory 
licenses in poor countries280 and lead to enhanced public-private 
cooperation with regard to both drugs emanating from developed 
countries and drugs needed for diseases that occur predominantly in 
developing countries.281   
If clinical trials were treated as a global public good, however, it 
would remain necessary for governments around the world who 
participated in such a scheme to contribute a fair share to the aggregate 
costs of conducting such clinical trials, adjusted for relative capacities to 
pay and for per capita gross domestic product (“GDP”).  Otherwise, any 
perceived free-rider problem would simply shift from the private to the 
public sector, without additional relief for taxpayers in the developed 
countries. 
In this connection, the elegant “fairness” calculations recently 
devised by Professor Fellmeth would seem particularly relevant and 
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worthy of careful scrutiny.282  Fellmeth analyzes several different models, 
including a “Simple Divisions Royalties Model” and a more 
sophisticated “Readjustable Royalties Model,” which takes into account 
such factors as the initial costs of R&D, the time value of money, the 
number of participants in the scheme, and their ability to pay.  Because 
his calculus, as it stands, is based entirely on private rights, it would have 
to be recast and transposed to a public sector framework that also took 
account of private inputs.  Thought must also be given to a global 
regulatory framework that, at a minimum, should oversee the collection 
and distribution of payments by governments in exchange for access to 
clinical trial results developed anywhere under the scheme.283  This 
fascinating topic awaits future research and another article. 
Nevertheless, if governments funded the bulk of clinical trials (in 
addition to current high levels of funding for basic research in 
developed countries), the heightened transparency pervading the supply 
chain should oblige originator pharmaceutical companies to lower prices 
everywhere to more accurately reflect their actual costs of production, 
their private R&D expenditures, and their marketing costs.284  If, 
instead, these companies—liberated to a large extent from the yoke of 
clinical trial costs—resisted pressures to reduce the prices of medicines 
in proportion to the public benefits received, while still earning 
revenues sufficient to cover costs and provide a competitive return on 
investment, that same transparency would expose them to liability for 
compulsory licensing and other legal measures available to address 
patent abuse and the larger public interest, as expressly envisioned by 
the TRIPS Agreement itself.285  It would also encourage demands for the 
price regulation schemes practiced in Canada and other developed 
countries286 and for greater government control of the innovation 
process as distinct from marketing concerns.287 
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CONCLUSION 
Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement requires WTO Members to 
protect the secret clinical trial data that foreign pharmaceutical 
companies submit for regulatory approval of new chemical entities 
against “disclosure” and “unfair commercial use.”288  This provision does 
not prevent governments from authorizing the generic manufacture of 
bioequivalent products on the basis of foreign regulatory approvals and 
the relevant scientific literature.  Nevertheless, governments must treat 
deposits of clinical test data by originator pharmaceutical companies as 
trade secrets and guard against their misappropriation by employees or 
third parties.289 
The freedom to authorize production of bioequivalent generic drugs 
that developing countries possess under Article 39.3 of TRIPS, as it 
stands, has been shrinking rapidly under pressures from TRIPS-plus 
provisions concerning clinical test data inserted into bilateral and 
regional Free Trade Agreements.290  These FTAs tend to provide a de 
facto sui generis exclusive property right on the originator companies’ 
test data, irrespective of any patent rights they may or may not hold.  
Moreover, the FTAs’ data exclusivity regimes have grown more 
stringent over time, and once implemented into domestic laws, they can 
delay local generic producers’ entry into developing country markets 
even where no patents exist for periods of five to fifteen years.291  FTA 
provisions on data exclusivity can also undermine other important 
flexibilities set out in the TRIPS Agreement, including the broad rights 
of WTO Members to impose compulsory licenses on patented 
pharmaceuticals under Article 31.  In this and other respects, such FTA 
provisions conflict with the spirit of the Doha Ministerial Declaration on 
TRIPS and Public Health.292 
Developing countries that have not yet committed to FTAs should 
remain wary of undervaluing the social costs of their intellectual 
property chapters, especially because any concessions made to the 
trading partner must be extended to all other WTO Members under the 
broad MFN clause set out in Article 4 of the TRIPS Agreement.293  
Developing countries should particularly resist obligations that would 
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limit regulatory approval of generic pharmaceuticals under Article 39.3, 
as it stands, and they should reject the data exclusivity framework that 
has emerged from recent United States FTAs with Latin American 
countries, among others.  If some form of compromise on the issue of 
clinical test data becomes unavoidable, developing country negotiators 
should stand firm on cost-sharing counter-proposals that would at least 
avoid barriers to entry for generic producers.294 
Attempts to justify the protection of clinical trial data as a separate 
and distinct subject matter of intellectual property law on the grounds of 
an incentive rationale, coupled with fairness considerations, appear 
dubious in the light of systematic legal and economic analysis.  Although 
the costs of clinical trials have soared and may become unsustainable 
over time,295 originator pharmaceutical companies have benefited from 
comparatively strong patent protection and the power it gives to charge 
high prices to consumers in both developed and developing countries, 
largely because they must recoup these costs. 
Moreover, government funding of basic medical research is so 
extensive in the United States at least that, in most cases, the 
downstream R&D costs of clinical trials are the main burden that 
originator companies bear, in addition to medicinal chemistry and 
marketing expenditures.  Given the strong patents that already support 
medical research results, the case for an additional revenue stream from 
a data exclusivity right sounding in an incentive rationale looks like 
special pleading.  To the extent that clinical test data protection may 
occasionally apply when patents were otherwise unavailable for various 
reasons, this justification would not support the logic of a patent-like 
exclusive property regime.  At most, in view of soaring clinical costs, a 
“compensatory liability regime” might be envisioned in appropriately 
circumscribed factual situations.296  Such a regime could oblige 
competitors to share the costs of clinical trials for a specified period of 
time. 
Even these fall back considerations should not normally apply to 
generic producers in developing countries who obtain regulatory 
approval from their governments by showing bioequivalence with drugs 
approved abroad, while otherwise meeting local health and safety 
requirements.  If the drugs in question were patented in these 
developing countries, local marketing approval would not entitle 
 
294. See supra text accompanying notes 134-54. 
295. See supra text accompanying notes 34-44. 
296. See supra notes 198-202 and accompanying text. 
REVISED REICHMAN FINAL 3-9-09 3/9/2009  2:26 PM 
2009] RETHINKING THE ROLE OF CLINICAL TRIAL DATA 67 
 
competitors to infringe the foreign patentees’ exclusive rights to make, 
use, and sell the patented products.297  If, instead, no patents applied to 
the product in question, it is never “unfair” to reverse-engineer products 
that are not covered by territorial patents, so long as the second comer 
does not misappropriate trade secrets and adopts distinctive trademarks 
of its own that avoid confusion or deception of consumers.298 
As matters stand, the originator pharmaceutical companies recoup 
the bulk of their R&D costs in the developed countries.  The marketing 
of these products in developing countries, whether patented or not, 
should in principle proceed on a “high-volume, low profit margin” 
approach, and not on a “high profit-low volume” approach as usually 
occurs today.299  Adding a backdoor exclusive property right in clinical 
test data to the originator companies’ legal arsenal only postpones 
needed price discrimination policies and further distorts the worldwide 
market for essential medicines.300 
However, these reflections on abusive uses of intellectual property 
rights in poor countries should not obscure the fact that soaring costs of 
clinical trials pose a major problem for global public health.  It should, 
instead, suggest that our whole way of thinking about the problems of 
regulatory approval for new pharmaceutical products needs to change.  
It is time to recognize that the conduct of clinical trials is a 
quintessential public good whose costs should be collectively defrayed 
by governments and whose results should be made universally available 
under the sharing norms of science. 
In the long run, if developed countries were persuaded to treat 
clinical trials of new pharmaceutical products as public goods in their 
domestic laws, the developing countries should favorably respond to 
proposals to treat them collectively as a global public good.  In that 
event, the latter’s willingness to support the costs of such trials wherever 
conducted, on a capacity to pay basis, would counter current pressures 
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for both secrecy and exclusive property rights, while helping to make 
clinical trial results available worldwide for follow-on R&D.  It would 
also lead to economies of scale and scope that should reduce the costs of 
clinical trials worldwide.  Above all, collective government funding 
could exert a powerful downward pressure on the prices of medicines, 
which currently express high risk premiums to cover the soaring costs of 
privately funded clinical trials in developed countries. 
Global public health could be further enhanced if the results of 
failed clinical testing became available for improvements under the 
liability rules discussed above.301  Rather than just shelving products with 
negative results or high risk premiums, resort to a non-exclusive 
licensing mechanism could enable companies everywhere to build on 
cumulative and sequential innovation in the pharmaceutical sector, 
while sharing both the costs of R&D and ultimate profits with first 
movers who had not altogether resolved problems of toxicity and safe 
delivery. 
To the extent that funding for clinical trials of new pharmaceutical 
products became a global public sector responsibility, it would yield at 
least three additional benefits.  First, by sharing clinical trial data under 
the open access norms of science, the costs of redundant investigations 
would be squeezed out of the global public health system.  Second, 
instead of further elevating the prices of existing pharmaceuticals in 
developing countries by means of a pseudo-intellectual property right in 
clinical test data, a global funding system based on equitable 
contributions to the overall costs of conducting such tests would lower 
supply costs and make both patented and unpatented medicines 
universally more affordable. 
Finally, as the private sector’s costs of certifying candidate drugs for 
marketing approval went down, the breakeven point for investment in 
research to discover new drugs should correspondingly drop, with a 
progressive lowering of barriers to entry around the world.  These 
phenomena would then intensify the incentive effects of existing 
international standards of intellectual property protection under the 
TRIPS Agreement and make it more feasible for small and medium-
sized firms everywhere to compete in the global pharmaceutical market 
on the basis of research-driven drug discovery. 
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